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1. INTRODUCTION 
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID)1 was created at a time when most African 
countries had just gained independence and foreign investment 
required a more legitimate2 protection in the former colonies.3  The 
ICSID Convention,4 which set up the Centre, came into force on 
                                                     
1 Comprehensive information on the history, structure, and operations of 
ICSID is available on the official website at www.worldbank.org/icsid.  
2 See, e.g., Louis T. Wells, Preface to THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
REGIME: EXPECTATIONS, REALITIES, OPTIONS xv, xvi (José E. Alvarez & Karl P. 
Sauvant eds., 2011) (“In the rather distant past, the United States and other rich 
countries would occasionally act militarily or insist on state-state arbitrations 
when their investors claimed mistreatment abroad.  Later, the United States 
would threaten (and occasionally act) to cut off aid, vote against loans by 
multilateral financial institutions to offending countries, and cancel trade 
preferences . . . .”).  
3 Professor Lowenfeld writes:  
By the early 1960s, following the wave of decolonization in Africa and 
parts of Asia, and a wave of take-overs of foreign investments 
throughout the Third World, it had become apparent that it would be 
very difficult to achieve consensus on the obligations of host countries 
toward alien investment (read multinational corporations).  The leading 
international aid institution, the World Bank, began to consider how, on 
the one hand, it could avoid becoming embroiled in controversies 
between home and host states concerning expropriation, and on the 
other hand, how it could assist the resolution of such controversies . . . . 
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 536–37 (2d ed. 2008).  See 
also Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 427, 436–37 (2010) (“[T]he existing international law at the end of World War 
II—what one might call the ‘ancien régime’—failed to adequately protect the 
foreign investments of their [capital-exporting] nationals from injurious actions by 
host country governments . . . . The need for such protection was heightened by 
the prospect of post-War economic expansion and the decolonization of territories 
that had previously been under the control of capital-exporting states.”). 
4 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States, Oct. 14, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, available 
at www.worldbank.org/icsid [hereinafter ICSID Convention].  For a 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/1
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October 14, 1966, when the twentieth instrument of ratification was 
deposited with the Secretariat of the United Nations.5  
Significantly, fifteen of the original deposits of the ratification 
instruments came from African states.6  Naturally, the very first 
respondent state in ICSID proceedings was also an African state.7 
Examination of the history of the ICSID Convention suggests 
that the African states’ instantaneous and overwhelming 
acceptance of ICSID was solely propelled by the perception that 
doing so would increase the flow of badly needed foreign direct 
investment (FDI) from the West into the newly independent 
continent,8 although the Convention itself makes no such express 
                                                     
comprehensive article-by-article commentary of the Convention, see Christoph H. 
Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2d ed. 2009).  
5 See List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention (as of 
November 1, 2013), INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISP. (Nov. 1, 2013), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&acti
onVal=ShowDocument&language=English (listing 158 States that have signed the 
Convention and 150 States that have deposited their instruments of ratification).  
6 Id.  The fifteen original African contracting states were:  Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, and 
Uganda.  A total of twenty instruments of ratification were deposited that day.  
The remaining six came from Iceland, Jamaica, Malaysia, Netherlands, and the 
United States.  Id. 
7 Holiday Inns S.A. & Others v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1 (1972).  
For a list of all concluded ICSID cases, see List of Concluded Cases, INT’L CTR. FOR 
SETTLEMENT INV. DISP., 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&
actionVal=ListConcluded (last visited April 2, 2014). 
8 The statements of the representative of Sierra Leone during the African 
legal consultative meeting that occurred in Addis Ababa in 1963 (which is 
discussed more fully infra section 2.2 summarizes the general understanding very 
well:  “[i]t would be easier for the developing countries to obtain the investments 
they needed if all agreements contained a clause to the effect that disputes could 
be referred to the Center [ICSID].”  INT’L CTR. FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT 
DISPUTES [ICSID], 2 HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION: DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE 
ORIGIN AND FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION 236, 255 (1968) [hereinafter History 
of ICSID].  For a discussion of this history, see infra section 2.2.  Studies have since 
questioned this proposition.  See, e.g., THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, and 
Investment Flows (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009) (questioning the 
impact of BITs on foreign direct investment flows); Jeswald W. Salacuse & 
Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 90 (2005) (“[I]nvestors . . . 
that are covered by a BIT certainly enjoy a higher degree of protection from the 
political risks of governmental intervention . . . .”).  
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promise.9  Structurally, however, ICSID’s close affiliations with the 
World Bank never sat very comfortably with the Africans from the 
very beginning.  The history is full of examples of expressions of 
misgivings about the establishment of a dispute settlement 
mechanism under the auspices of Africa’s principal financier.10 
While the history of Africa’s relations with the Bank itself has 
been a troubled one,11 it is remarkable that over the last half-
century, many African states voluntarily submitted to the 
jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals and answered charges of 
expropriation and other alleged violations of the rights of private 
investors in Washington, D.C. and various European fora.  Indeed, 
since its inception, more than twenty percent of all ICSID cases 
involved African states as respondents, with sixteen percent 
involving Sub-Saharan states.12  Interestingly, however, so far, only 
two percent of the arbitrators and conciliators have been from Sub-
Saharan Africa.13  Approximately seventy percent of all the 
                                                     
9 ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at pmbl.  It appears to have been carefully 
drafted to avoid exactly that implication.  It reads in relevant part:  “Considering 
the need for international cooperation for economic development, and the role of 
private international investment therein; Bearing in mind the possibility that from 
time to time disputes may arise in connection with such investment between 
Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States.”  Id. 
10 AMAZU A. ASOUZU, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AFRICAN 
STATES: PRACTICE, PARTICIPATION AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 224–25 (2001) 
(summarizing the discussions indicating the African states’ concerns about the 
affiliation of the Center with the World Bank, including concerns about the 
merger of the positions of the Bank’s presidency with the chair of the 
Administrative Council of the Center). 
11 See, e.g., Celia W. Dugger, World Bank Neglects African Farming, Study Says, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/15/world/africa/ 
15worldbank.html (“Professor Sachs called the evaluation ‘a blistering, 
devastating critique.’  Professor Easterly, a research economist at the bank for 
more than a decade, likened the evaluation to saying Coca-Cola is bad at making 
its signature soft drink.  ‘Here’s your most important client, Africa, with its most 
important sector, agriculture, relevant to the most important goal—people feeding 
their families—and the bank has been caught with two decades of neglect,’ he 
said.”). 
12 ICSID, THE ICSID CASELOAD—STATISTICS 11 (2012), available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&acti
onVal=ShowDocument&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English31 
[hereinafter ICSID 2012 STATISTICS].  These latest ICSID statistics shows that 
sixteen percent of all ICSID cases were from Sub-Saharan Africa while ten percent 
were from the Middle East and North Africa.  ICSID follows the World Bank’s 
regional classification and merges North African States with the Middle East.  
Because many of the North African States have had cases before ICSID, the 
percentage of African States is clearly more than twenty percent.  Id.   
13 Id. at 16.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/1
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arbitrators, conciliators, and ad hoc committee members have been 
Western Europeans or North Americans.14  Significantly, forty-
seven percent of all arbitrators and conciliators have been Western 
Europeans15 while the number of Western European states that 
were ever called upon to answer charges before ICSID tribunals in 
Washington or elsewhere was limited to a mere one percent.16  
Even more remarkably, less than five percent of all arbitrators, 
conciliators, and ad hoc committee members have been women.17 
Today, Africa’s largest infrastructure financier is no longer the 
World Bank—it is China.  Indeed, it was back in 2005 that the 
volume of China’s investment in African infrastructure surpassed 
that of the World Bank’s.18  In the decade of 2000, trade between 
Africa and China alone grew substantially.19  According to a recent 
UNCTAD report, the share of Asian Foreign Direct Investment 
inflows to Africa rose from 6.7% for the period 1995-1999, to 15.2% 
for the period 2000-2008.20  Now, a network of at least thirty-five 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) purportedly protects China’s 
enormous investment in Africa.21  The treaties signed after China’s 
                                                     
14 Id.   
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 11. 
17 Michael Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political? 27 & tbl.2 (Nov. 5, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.wipol.uni-bonn.de/ 
lehrveranstaltungen-1/lawecon-workshop/archive/dateien/waibelwinter11-12 
[hereinafter Waibel & Wu Study] (conducting an empirical study based on ICSID 
database review).  
18 CHARLES ROXBURGH ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., LIONS ON THE MOVE: 
THE PROGRESS AND POTENTIAL OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES 15-16 (2010), available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/Insights and 
pubs/MGI/Research/Productivity Competitiveness and Growth/Lions on the 
move The progress of African economies/MGI_Lions_on_the_move_african_ 
economies_full_report.ashx.  The report cites Chinese investment of $23 billion for 
the development of Nigerian refinery Capacity and $5–8 billion investment in 
Liberia and Guinea for railroads, ports and mines as examples.  Id.  Chinese 
investments are also replacing some of Africa’s traditional business partners.  Id.   
19 AFRICAN CTR. FOR ECON. TRANSFORMATION (ACET), LOOKING EAST: A POLICY 
BRIEF ON ENGAGING CHINA FOR AFRICAN POLICY-MAKERS 4, 5, 11 (2009), available at 
http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/uploads/files/2506a097-7a04-4da1-9af8-
4423debec17e-lookingeastv1.pdf. 
20 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. (UNCTAD), ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
IN AFRICA REPORT 2010: SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION AND THE NEW FORMS OF 
DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP, at 84, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2010, 
U.N. Sales No. E.10.II.D.13 (2010), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ 
aldcafrica2010_en.pdf.  
21 Norah Gallagher & Wenhua Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies 
and Practice 39–40 (2009). 
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accession to ICSID in 1993 provide for open access to ICSID 
arbitration.22  However, China does not have as much experience 
with ICSID as Africa, although it has shown interest in pursuing 
investment arbitration in recent years as it assumes a greater role 
as an exporter of capital and seeks to protect its rapidly growing 
investments abroad.23  Nonetheless, as this article will 
demonstrate, at its very core, ICSID was never designed for, nor 
has it ever meaningfully served, South-South disputes—which 
China-Africa disputes technically are.  In light of this background, 
this article weighs in on the debate over ICSID’s legitimacy from 
the perspective of Africa’s experience in the last half-century and 
evaluates ICSID’s suitability to resolve current and future 
investment disputes that arise out of the new economic 
partnerships between African states and Chinese investors. 
The article is divided into five parts.  Part 2 examines the 
various narratives on ICSID’s legitimacy and critically appraises 
the existing empirical studies in light of Africa’s experience.  Part 3 
discusses Africa’s position on the fundamental doctrinal dilemma 
in foreign investment law vis-à-vis the new China factor.  Part 4 
provides a case study of selected ICSID cases involving African 
states to put the empirical studies in context and shed some light 
on the nature of justice that the tribunals have dispensed.  Part 5 
provides a more focused assessment of ICSID’s suitability for the 
resolution of disputes between African states and Chinese 
investors.  Part 6 concludes the article. 
2. THE ICSID LEGITIMACY DEBATE AND THE EMERGING EMPIRICAL 
JUSTIFICATION 
A provocative and oft-cited New York Times article once touted: 
“Their meetings are secret.  Their members are generally unknown.  
                                                     
22 See id. at 38 (discussing the reduction of Chinese skepticism towards using 
ICSID to arbitrate international investment disputes and China’s ultimate signing 
and ratification of the ICSID Convention).  The BITs that China signed after its 
accession to the ICSID Convention in 1993 are with:  South Africa (1997), 
Congo(DR) (2000), Botswana (2000), Sierra Leone (2001), Mozambique (2001), 
Kenya (2001), Nigeria (2001), Conte d’Ivoire (2002), Djibouti (2003), Benin (2004), 
Uganda (2004), Tunisia (2004), Seychelles (2007).  Id. at 42 tbl.1.2. 
23 Chinese companies have begun using ICSID as an arbitral forum in recent 
times.  See, e.g., Ping An Life Ins. Co. of China, Ltd. & Ping An Ins. (Grp.) Co. of 
China, Ltd. v. Kingdom of Belg., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29 (2013); Tza Yap 
Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6 (2007) (serving as examples 
of Chinese companies availing themselves of ICSID).   
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/1
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The decisions they reach need not be fully disclosed.  Yet the way a 
small number of international tribunals handles disputes between 
investors and foreign governments has led to national laws being 
revoked, justice systems questioned and environmental regulations 
challenged.”24  Interestingly, this was said in relation to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) investment 
arbitration.25  If these perceived intricacies affect the United States 
and Canada so greatly, how do the African states appearing before 
these tribunals fare?  Opinions on ICSID arbitration range from 
harsh allegations of neo-liberal attempts to bankrupt developing 
countries26 to more nuanced statements of misgivings27 to the 
expression of confidence that ICSID is a fair and equitable forum.28 
The fact that ICSID tribunals have always suffered from a 
serious lack of diversity is not a subject of dispute, as it could 
clearly be seen from ICSID’s publicly available arbitrator-
nationality pie-chart, which needs no interpretation.29  
Interestingly, however, mainstream scholarly discourses have 
largely ignored how this deficit impacts arbitration outcomes; 
instead, scholars frame the issue, at a more general level, as 
contributing to coherency of the jurisprudence produced and 
                                                     
24 Anthony DePalma, Nafta’s Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle 
Disputes, But Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/11/business/nafta-s-powerful-little-secret-
obscure-tribunals-settle-disputes-but-go-too-far.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
25 Id. 
26 See, e.g., NICK BUXTON, TRANSNAT’L INST. & CORP. EUR. OBSERVATORY, 
LEGALIZED PROFITEERING? HOW CORPORATE LAWYERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT 
BOOM 1, 4–6 (2011), available at http://www.sierraclub.ca/en/main-page/ 
legalized-profiteering-how-corporate-lawyers-are-fuelling-investment-arbitration-
boom (describing the injustice created by the arbitration system in forcing 
developing and economically crippled countries to defendant themselves at great 
cost and with a substantial likelihood of losing a judgment equal to a substantial 
percentage of their national budget); Cecilia Olivet, The Dark Side of Investment 
Agreements, TRANSNAT’L INST., Dec. 2011, at 1, 4, available at http://www.tni.org 
/sites/www.tni.org/files/the_dark_side_of_investment_treaties-final.pdf 
(discussing the adverse affects international investment arbitrations have on 
developing countries due to the rules favoring transnational corporations).   
27 See generally R. Rajesh Babu, International Commercial Arbitration and the 
Developing Countries 4 ASIAN-AFRICAN CONSULTATIVE ORG. Q. BULL. 385 (2006) 
(discussing arguments against ICSID and international investment arbitration 
based on the adverse consequences for developing countries). 
28 Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 
50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 435 (2009) [hereinafter Franck Study]. 
29 ICSID 2012 STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 16.  See the pie-chart of arbitrator 
nationality.  Id. 
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procedural regularity.30  Quite remarkably, there is little discussion 
about the sources of the imbalance and the justifications that 
sustain it:  a gap that this article attempts to begin to fill. 
At the most general level, the dominant narrative is that 
“[i]nvestment arbitration is a success story”31 and, of course, ICSID 
is a major part of it—with NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitrations 
exemplifying the alleged success.32  Measured by caseload growth 
and enforcement track-record, ICSID has indeed been a “success 
story.”  Having stayed almost dormant for decades—averaging 
one to four cases a year—the caseload began an upward trajectory 
in 1997, then receiving ten cases and steadily increasing to reach 
thirty-eight cases by the end of 2011.33  This “success” is attributed 
to several factors, including the phenomenal growth of BITs, most 
of which provide for free access to investor-state arbitration.34   
As the foundational assumption that BITs improve the 
developing world’s ability to attract foreign investment has 
increasingly come under scrutiny,35 and a critical mass of 
investment treaty arbitration decisions and awards became 
publicly available for review, critical inquiries about the legitimacy 
of the system as a whole began to emerge.  Bolivia’s public 
renunciation of the Convention in 2007,36 and Ecuador’s similar 
                                                     
30 See infra notes 38–67 and accompanying text (discussing the mainstream 
scholarly discourse surrounding the coherence and consistency of ICSID tribunal 
decisions).   
31 August Reinisch, The Future of Investment Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH 
SCHREUER 894, 894 (Christina Binder, Ursula Kriebaum, August Reinisch & 
Stephan Wittich eds., 2009). 
32  The public attention to the Methanex case supports this notion.  Methanex 
Corp. v. United States, NAFTA Arbitral Tribunal, Final Award on Jurisdiction and 
Merits (Aug. 3, 2005), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf.  See DePalma, supra 
note 24, at 1, 5 (highlighting the ICSID arbitration case Methanex v. United States 
and discussing the use of investment arbitration due to the vast reach of 
multinational corporations).    
33 ICSID 2012 STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 7.  The total cases as of that date are 
369.  This figure includes the ICSID Additional Facilities cases. 
34 See Reinisch, supra note 31, at 895.  Currently, there are approximately 3000 
BITs in effect.   
35 See, e.g., Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 8 (arguing that BITs do help 
countries promote foreign direct investment, though the benefits are slow to 
appear).   
36 Press Release, ICSID, Bolivia Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the 
ICSID Convention (May 16, 2007), available at https://icsid.worldbank. 
org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageTyp
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/1
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action in 2009,37 fueled the curiosity of the scholarly community, 
resulting in the production of a corpus of instructive commentary 
on the legitimacy of the international investment arbitration 
system in general and ICSID in particular.38 
                                                     
e=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcemen
t3  (“On May 2, 2007, the World Bank received a written notice of denunciation of 
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States (the ICSID Convention) from the Republic of Bolivia.  In 
accordance with Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, the denunciation will take 
effect six months after the receipt of Bolivia’s notice, i.e., on November 3, 2007.  In 
its capacity as the depository of the ICSID Convention, and as required by Article 
75 of the ICSID Convention, the World Bank has notified all ICSID signatory 
States of the Republic of Bolivia’s denunciation of the ICSID Convention.”). 
37 Press Release, ICSID, Ecuador Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the 
ICSID Convention (July 9, 2009), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=Announc
ementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement20 (“On 
July 6, 2009, the World Bank received a written notice of denunciation of the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States (the ICSID Convention) from the Republic of Ecuador.  
In accordance with Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, the denunciation will take 
effect six months after the receipt of Ecuador’s notice, i.e., on January 7, 2010.  In 
its capacity as the depository of the ICSID Convention, and as required by Article 
75 of the ICSID Convention, the World Bank has notified all ICSID signatory 
States of the Republic of Ecuador’s denunciation of the ICSID Convention.”).  
38 Chief among them is INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY, supra note 31.  Another example is the Harvard International Law 
Journal, which largely dedicated the second issue of its 50th volume, published in 
the summer of 2009, to this topic.  50 HARV. INT’L L.J. (2009), available at 
http://www.harvardilj.org/2009/06/issue_50-2.  Around the same time period, 
the Chicago Journal of International Law (Vol. 9, Winter 2009) and the Suffolk 
Transnational Law Review also dedicated symposium issues to this issue.  9 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. (2009); 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. (2009).  Summarizing the objectives 
and proceedings of the Suffolk symposium, Professor David Caron noted:  “In 
this Symposium’s discussion of investor state arbitration, there may at first blush 
appear to be two very different points of perspective.  On the one hand, a number 
of the articles view investor state arbitration as a system from afar: The view from 
’20,000 feet.’  On the other hand, a number of articles are from the perspective of 
having been involved in individual arbitrations: The view from ’in the trenches.’  
At the level of individual arbitrations, questions often focus on how to win, or 
how to survive, the arbitration.  From the perspective of the system, questions 
often focus on how the system of investment arbitration might better meet its 
objectives which in part often involve assessments about the legitimacy of the 
system as a whole.”  David D. Caron, Investor State Arbitration: Strategic and 
Tactical Perspectives on Legitimacy, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 513, 513 (2009).  
Other notable parts of this corpus include a collection of essays in THE BACKLASH 
AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY (Michael Waibel et 
al. eds., 2010) and GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC 
LAW (2007). 
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The most serious indictment of the system, of course, goes to 
the very essence of the investor-state arbitration system and the 
arbitrator accountability issue.  Gus Van Harten describes these 
concerns very well:  “arbitrators autonomously resolve core 
questions of public law:  whether legislation is discriminatory, 
whether regulation is expropriation, whether a court decision is 
unfair or inequitable. . . . Th[e] lack of judicial supervision renders 
the arbitrator’s interpretation of public law—itself a fundamentally 
sovereign act—unaccountable in the conventional sense.”39 
Professor David Caron analyzes the dominant narrative about 
ICSID legitimacy concerns under four headings:  “(1) the 
coherency of the system, (2) the integrity of decision-makers, (3) 
the representation of the public and (4) the curtailment of state 
public choice."40 
The concern that is often framed in the context of coherency 
essentially pertains to the consistency of the substantive 
jurisprudence that the tribunals have generated over the last half-
century.41  Professor Caron does not believe that the jurisprudence 
is so incoherent as to deprive “the system” of legitimacy.42  Indeed, 
he argues, rather convincingly, that “the root of the problem is 
embedded very deeply in the structure of arbitration itself” 
because, in essence, it is not “a system” but “a framework” within 
which investment claims are resolved under very diverse legal 
regimes much like commercial arbitration.43  For him, the challenge 
                                                     
39 VAN HARTEN, supra note 38, at 156. 
40 Caron, supra note 38, at 516.  
41 This is one of the main factors that attracted the most commentary.  See, 
e.g., JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 241 (2005) (“[T]he 
idea is not consistency at any cost, but respectable consistency.”); Charles N. 
Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of 
International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471 (2009) (positing that, although 
inconsistency is currently a problem, the passage of time will lead to more 
uniform results); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005) (proposing the creation of a permanent appellate 
body, enhanced transparency, and increased academic scrutiny in order to combat 
inconsistency); Jacques Werner, Making Investment Arbitration More Certain: A 
Modest Proposal, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT 767 (2003) (endorsing an appellate level of 
review for investment arbitration decisions and arguing that arbitrators should 
play an active role in consolidating proceedings or staying decisions where other 
arbitral panels have already issued an award).  
42 Caron, supra note 38, at 516.  
43 Id.  Caron rejects the idea that commercial and investment arbitrations are 
recognizably distinct.  Id. at 513-14.  
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of coherency is inherent.44  In fact, to the extent there is coherency, 
it is more “coincidental than planned.”45  Moreover, coherency is 
more of an academic concern than a practical one because the users 
of the investment dispute settlement framework seem to tolerate a 
significant level of irregularity that academics might consider 
erroneous.46  Caron similarly rejects the academic call for appellate 
discipline because, according to him, there is “little evident desire 
thus far on behalf of parties and states to build appeal structures 
which might yield greater consistency.”47 
Other critics give the issue of jurisprudential coherence more 
weight than Professor Caron because, unlike a purely private 
commercial arbitration, ICSID tribunals often sit in judgment of a 
sovereign act with profound public implications.  For example, 
following the rendering of conflicting awards against the Czech 
Republic in CME v. Czech Republic48 and Lauder v. Czech Republic,49 
Blackaby of Freshfields is quoted as saying: “Any system where 
diametrically opposed decisions can legally coexist cannot last 
long.  It shocks the sense of rule of law or fairness.”50  These two 
cases, along with the expressions of frustration by lawyers, are 
profound demonstrations of jurisprudential incoherency that 
characterizes investment arbitration today.  Both cases were 
predicated on the same BIT provision and involved the same 
                                                     
44 Id. at 516.  
45 Id. at 517 (“ICSID can be schizophrenic in this way--on the one hand, 
imagining ICSID as a framework calls for a concentrated focus on the particular 
dispute, while at the same time, imagining ICSID as a system represents an 
attempt to rearrange all of the free standing arbitrations as though they were part 
of a court system.  This situation can lead to great surprise and frustration when 
the realization hits home that the patterns that sometimes present are more 
coincidental than planned.  The question of whether there is a system present 
depends on whether the questions shared by the various tribunals are identical, or 
perhaps nearly so.  Certainly ICSID tribunals share the procedural and 
jurisdictional limitations of the ICSID convention, but they do not necessarily 
address the same identical substantive questions since usually different 
concessions or BITs are involved.”). 
46 Id.  
47 Id.  
48 CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award 
(Sept. 13, 2001), 9 ICSID Rep. 121 (2006); 14 WORLD TRADE & ARB. MAT’LS 109 
(2002) (cited in Reinisch, supra note 31, at 907).  
49 Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Sept. 3, 2001), 9 
ICSID Rep. 66 (2006); WORLD TRADE & ARB. MAT’LS, supra note 48.  
50 VAN HARTEN, supra note 38, at 166 (citation omitted). 
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issues.51  While, in Lauders, the tribunal denied recovery, in CME, it 
awarded the investor nearly $500 million.52 
Broadening the inquiry further, Van Harten suggests that “the 
burden of incoherence is borne most by those countries that lack 
the legal and administrative capacity effectively to fight off, or 
deter, investor claims.”53  According to Reinisch, “[w]hat is far 
more serious for the acceptance of investment arbitration in 
general is a potential loss of confidence stemming from 
incomprehensible, unpredictable, and/or contradictory decisions 
and awards.”54  He notes that, in recent times, the manifestations of 
the jurisprudential incoherence touch the very sensitive balance 
between the State’s sovereign regulatory right and private 
investment protection as exemplified by environmental cases such 
as the Methanex case.55  Some others, however, suggest that there 
already is sufficient coherence that sustains the regime,56 while 
others are hopeful that jurisprudential coherence and predictability 
will come through time.57 
                                                     
51 See Reinisch, supra note 31, at 907 (mentioning the similarities of the 
Lauders and CME cases). 
52 Id. at 907-08.  
53 VAN HARTEN, supra note 38, at 167.  
54 Reinisch, supra note 31, at 904.  
55 See id. at 903 (citing Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award on 
Jurisdiction and Merits (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2005)).  There are many investment 
arbitration cases involving the issue of indirect expropriation.  For a recent 
analysis and additional citations, see SUZY H. NIKIEMA, IISD BEST PRACTICES 
INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION (2012), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/ 
best_practice_indirect_expropriation.pdf.  For an older NAFTA-focused analysis 
of the issue, see Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvias, The Global Fifth Amendment? 
NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International 
“Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30 (2003).  
56 Most notably, in his 2010 article, Professor Salacuse, employing regime 
theory, suggests that there is “a surprisingly high degree of uniformity and 
consistency.”  Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 427, 467 (2010).  He attributes this to the similarity in the 
substantive rules contained in the nearly 3000 BITs, and to decision making by 
“the epistemic community” of similarly situated mainly Western arbitrators who 
produce the bulk of the jurisprudence.  Id. at 465. 
57 See Brower & Schill, supra note 41, at 473–74 (“While some of these 
problems, in particular unpredictability and incoherence in investor-state dispute 
settlement, are considerable and in need of serious attention, arguably a solution 
will come with the passage of time.  Increasing dispute-settlement procedures and 
doctrinal efforts promise to prove that concepts relating to investors’ rights, such 
as fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropriation, are not as vague and 
indeterminate as some argue.  They increasingly will provide yardsticks for the 
judicial settlement of disputes that have proven to be workable not only in several 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/1
01_KIDANE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2014  3:06 AM 
2014] THE CHINA-AFRICA FACTOR 571 
The second concern pertains to the integrity of the decision 
makers.  Although it is, at times, “[p]hrased in terms of 
illegitimacy, this critique becomes an assertion of corruption.”58  
Caron notes that because outright corruption among arbitrators is 
rare, the legitimacy concern relating to corruption in essence 
touches the “identity, equality, independence and impartiality of 
arbitrators.”59  Although he identifies the problems and states them 
very well, he does not belabor the issue further except critiquing 
the proposal to create a permanent panel of arbitrators as 
impracticable and unattractive to the parties who would want to 
nominate their own arbitrators.60 
The third concern is the denial of the representation of the 
public interest—in other words, the State, which is the respondent 
in investment arbitration, may not necessarily represent the 
interests of the communities that may be affected by the outcome 
of the arbitration.61  Professor Caron puts it in its proper context by 
saying “[e]levating the community past the state respondent 
creates a number of obvious political tensions”62 and suggests that 
civil society involvement through amicus filings might be a good 
solution.63 
The fourth concern is more fundamental and one which 
concerns the curtailing of state public interest, especially in 
regulatory takings cases.  This concern goes to the heart of what 
Van Harten explains as the accountability problems of “The 
Businessman’s Court” sitting in judgment of sovereign decisions.64  
                                                     
international fora—such as the Iran-US Claims Tribunal or the various claims 
commissions established at the beginning of the twentieth century to solve 
investment-related disputes—but also in domestic courts that entertain disputes 
concerning the relationship between property protection and competing private 
and public interests.  Thus, the passage of time—bringing with it a continuous 
stream of investment jurisprudence, a refinement of state practice and treaty 
making, and growing doctrinal analysis—may help create a better understanding 
of the content and scope of the central principles of investment protection and 
result in the creation of a jurisprudence constante.”) (footnotes omitted). 
58 Caron, supra note 38, at 518. 
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 519.  A very interesting point Professor Caron notes from experience 
is how “parties at present will go to great lengths to avoid ICSID making the 
appointment of the chair from its roster.”  Id.  
61 Id. at 520. 
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
64 VAN HARTEN, supra note 38, at 152–84.  
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Professor Caron suggests that the convergence of interests around 
this issue, as exemplified by China’s increasing outward 
investment and changing attitudes, might help resolve the problem 
in the long term.65  While that is true in some respects when China 
is taken in isolation, the fundamental question is enduring. 
Apart from the macro level systemic concerns, there are 
concerns at the micro level involving each arbitration; they largely 
include mundane challenges that any kind of adjudicatory system 
faces, such as efficacy, cost, competence, poor reasoning, and 
ethics.66  There is no shortage of suggestions as to how to make 
improvements in these areas.67  
2.1. Empirical Studies 
ICSID does make vital information about most cases, including 
the names of arbitrators and counsels, available on its website.68  
However, there is a dearth of comprehensive and systematic 
empirical analysis of these cases.  With that note, this section 
proceeds to review the limited available studies in association with 
the ICSID database and sets the stage for the Africa-specific 
assessment in the next sections. 
As of March 28, 2012, the ICSID database shows that 233 cases 
have been concluded and 142 cases are pending.69  While seventy 
percent of the arbitrators have come from Western Europe and 
North America, only two percent of all arbitrators have come from 
Sub-Saharan Africa.70  In terms of the host states, while only one 
percent of cases involved Western European states, sixteen percent 
of all cases involved Sub-Saharan African states.71  ICSID data 
                                                     
65 Caron, supra note 38, at 521 (“The old dichotomy has ceased to exist for 
some and we now find ourselves in a much more nuanced situation.  In other 
terms, we could say that there once were upstream states and downstream states.  
But now there is only a lake where there is a convergence of interest of the states 
bordering the lake.”).  
66 Id. at 522–23.  
67 See, e.g., Reinisch, supra note 31, at 908–16 (proposing means of quality 
assurance, appellate mechanism and de facto precedence). 
68 ICSID Cases, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet 
?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=Cases_Home (last 
visited March 18, 2013). 
69 List of ICSID Cases, ISCID, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet 
?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ListCases (last visited March 18, 2013). 
70 Id.  
71 Id.   
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further shows that while eighty-five percent of all cases involved 
an investor from a developed country as the claimant and a 
developing country as the respondent, only ten percent of all cases 
involved an investor from a developing country as the claimant 
and a developing country as the respondent.72  Quite interestingly, 
one of the two empirical studies of the ICSID database conducted 
recently suggests that arbitrators from developing countries 
arbitrate cases mainly between an investor from a developing 
country and a developing state.73  Most significantly, ninety-five 
percent of all arbitrators so far have been men—described as 
“members of an exclusive and lucrative club, whose members are 
sometimes compared to a club of mainly European, gray-haired 
and well-connected men.”74  No sophisticated empirical studies are 
needed to prove the glaring diversity deficit, but what do the 
studies conclude? 
The Convention’s requirements of arbitrator qualifications are 
generic:  good moral character, impartiality, and technical 
competence.75  This rule cannot explain the disproportionately 
Western appointments.  Explanation may lay in history, location, 
and affiliation.  No attempt is made to provide comprehensive 
explanation here; however, it is important to note that such 
appointments necessitate the hiring of counsel with similar 
background which makes them acceptable to the arbitrators.  
Apparently for that reason, developing host states hire European 
and American law firms disproportionately.76  The fees for leading 
arbitration specialists sometimes exceed $1000 per hour, which 
does not include additional fees for their associates at several 
hundred dollars an hour.77  Remarkably, by contrast, most 
developed countries mostly rely on in-house counsel in ICSID 
cases.78 
                                                     
72 Id.  For the World Bank’s and OECD’s classification of “developing” and 
“developed” nations, see Franck Study, supra note 28, at 446–47. 
73 Waibel & Wu Study, supra note 17, at 27.  
74 Id. at 18. 
75 ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at art. 14(1). 
76 See Waibel & Wu Study, supra note 17, at 28. (“[A]rbitrators from 
developing countries are significantly underrepresented.  The proximate cause 
goes deeper: most host countries hire European and US law firms and legal 
counsel to defend against ICSID claims.”) (footnote omitted). 
77 Id. (citing SCHREUER, supra note 4, at art. 60, para. 8). 
78 See Waibel & Wu Study, supra note 17, at 21 (“For example, the United 
States, Mexico, Canada and Argentina, which account for twenty percent of 
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A couple of focused, smaller empirical studies have tested the 
impact of certain personal characteristics of arbitrators on case 
outcome.  The first such study was conducted by Professor Susan 
Franck of Washington and Lee Law School.  She describes her 
findings in her article titled “Development and Outcomes of 
Investment Treaty Arbitration.”79  The second empirical study was 
conducted by Professors Michael Waibel of Lauterpacht Center at 
Cambridge and Yanhui Wu of USC Marshall School of Business.  It 
is titled “Are Arbitrators Political?”80  Although they do not focus 
on the exact same set of variables, the two studies arrive at 
inconsistent findings to the extent they converge on the topics.  
Such inconsistencies might suggest the inevitable shortcomings of 
quantitative and even qualitative measurements of outcome to 
assess the nature or quality of justice in these kinds of cases; 
however, a combination of quantitative studies and a careful 
qualitative examination of selected cases might shed some light on 
the reality of ICSID arbitral justice.  Therefore, the following 
sections focus on the above cited quantitative studies followed by a 
careful review of selected cases involving African states to measure 
the nature of justice that they have been receiving from ICSID 
tribunals in the last half-century. 
2.2. A Closer Look at the Empirical Studies 
It is fair to say that the ICSID database has been ripe for 
empirical analysis.  While more comprehensive analysis is almost 
certainly forthcoming, the inquiry here will be limited to the two 
relatively recent studies mentioned above. 
Professor Susan Franck’s study empirically tested three 
hypotheses:  
 
First, what kind of interaction effect might exist between 
the development status of the government respondent and 
the development status of the presiding arbitrator that 
could influence the outcome?  Second, how does the 
respondent’s development status affect outcome, if at all?  
                                                     
respondent states in our dataset, routinely handle all aspects of investment 
disputes in-house.  Outside attorneys are only used on occasion to supplement in-
house legal capabilities.”).  
79 Franck Study, supra note 28. 
80 Waibel & Wu, supra note 17. 
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Third, how does the presiding arbitrator’s development 
status affect outcome, if at all?  In other words, is there a 
main effect for either respondent state’s development status 
or presiding arbitrator’s development status?81 
What the Franck Study labels “development status” is 
apparently the development status of the country that hosts the 
investment which generated the controversy, and the development 
status of the country of the presiding arbitrator’s nationality.82  The 
Study relied on two sources for the determination of development 
status:  OECD membership and World Bank’s income based 
classification (high-upper-middle-lower-middle and low income.)83 
The Study found that “there was no significant pattern of 
relationship between the World Bank status of the presiding 
arbitrator, the World Bank status of the respondent state, and the 
winner of an investment treaty arbitration.”84  It further found that 
for the selected sample of awards, “the number of winners and 
losers were statistically equivalent.”85 
To arrive at this conclusion, the Franck Study analyzed forty-
nine cases presided over by forty-nine arbitrators rendering forty-
seven awards.  A closer look at the numbers suggests that thirty-six 
of the forty-nine arbitrators came from high income or OCED 
countries.  The representation of upper-middle, lower-middle and 
low-income countries was 8-5-0 respectively.86  Because there were 
zero presiding arbitrators from low-income countries, the Study 
collapsed the numbers corresponding to the upper-middle and 
lower-middle countries, i.e., eight plus five and ran the equation 
against the thirty-six.87  That is how it found statistical equivalency 
and concluded that “[t]he consistency in these results offers a 
powerful narrative that there is procedural integrity in investment 
arbitration.”88 
Before observations about these findings are offered, it 
important to look at one additional and interesting finding, which 
                                                     
81 Franck Study, supra note 28, at 454 (footnotes omitted). 
82 Id. at n.111 and accompanying text.  
83 Id. at 455–56.  
84 Id. at 462. 
85 Id. at 460.  
86 Id. at 459 tbl.2.  
87 Id. at 459–60.  
88 Id. at 464.  
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is that “presiding arbitrators from the developing world made 
larger awards against developing countries and smaller awards 
against developed countries.”89  This being the only source of bias 
the Study found, it suggests that “[e]ven at this stage, it is worth 
considering what should be done to address the potential bias of 
arbitrators from the developing world in favor of the developed 
world.”90  In trying to explain the possible source of bias, the Study 
speculates that “[it] may be that arbitrators from the developing 
world (particularly those seeking repeat appointments) believe that 
rulings in favor of the developed world are the price of admission 
to the ’club.’”91 
Several observations could be made about this study.  First, it 
looks at the least controversial issue.  There is little concern, if any, 
that arbitrators might be biased for or against a state based on its 
level of development.  If the United States enacts environmental 
laws that render Canadian investment in California unprofitable, 
the development stage of the potential presiding arbitrator’s 
country might be the last thing that the selection process would 
look at as the ideological leanings and previous track-record are 
more important than whether he or she is from Australia or 
Indonesia.  It is clear that a person’s ideological leanings could be 
influenced by that person’s upbringing, education, exposure, 
personal interest, and a whole host of other factors, which might 
include place of birth or perhaps, more importantly, place of 
residence.  Nationality, however, is simply a poor indicator of 
political, ideological, or any other kind of bias.  Second, the 
numbers do not seem to be well-balanced for a valid quantitative 
measurement when the study is forced to collapse categories to 
help the analysis.  One notable fact is that there were no presiding 
arbitrators from low-income countries in the dataset although low-
income countries routinely arbitrate cases before ICSID.  That is 
one of the fundamental deficits that the Study fails to adequately 
address.  Third, the Study concludes that to the extent there is bias 
or even lack of integrity, it implicates arbitrators from developing 
countries who seem to impose more substantial penalties in the 
form of an award against developing countries possibly motivated 
by their desire to be more acceptable to the “club.”  While the 
finding itself seems interesting, the attributed motive almost 
                                                     
89 Id. at 478. 
90 Id.   
91 Id. at 479.  
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contradicts the main finding, i.e., lack of development-based bias.  
A question might be asked, if the “club” is not entirely biased, why 
would arbitrators from developing countries think that they would 
gain more acceptance by imposing more significant awards against 
developing countries—unless, of course, they are misjudging their 
colleagues’ perceptions, which the study does not suggest.  Finally, 
the Study omits the most serious and more credible allegation of 
bias, namely, ideological bias in favor of private investors (read 
multi-national corporations) no matter where they make their 
investment.  This question is often framed as “investor-bias” or 
“host-country-bias.”92  Nobody could credibly allege that such bias 
is decisively associated with the development status of the 
arbitrator’s country of nationality.  Significantly, however, 
Professor Franck’s previous93 and subsequent studies more or less 
replicated the same results.94     
Drawing on the rich social science literature that substantially 
assesses the impact of personal characteristics—such as political 
ideology and collegiate politics—on case outcomes in domestic 
court litigation,95 Waibel and Wu test different hypotheses relative 
                                                     
92 The Franck Study expressly excludes this inquiry.  See id. at 479 n.16 and 
accompanying text (“This research does not evaluate differences in whether 
investors come from the developed or developing world because approximately 
10% of investors were from developing world.”).   
93 In her 2007 study, finding no pro-investor bias, Professor Franck concludes 
that “[r]ecognizing the limitations, the initial descriptive quantitative data from 
public awards suggest investment treaty arbitration appears to be functioning 
relatively well.  There is, nevertheless, room for improvement.”  Susan D. Franck, 
Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 
83 (2007). 
94 Her 2011 study that compared the ICSID case outcome with other 
investment arbitrations also finds no bias on the basis of the development status 
(expressly noting Latin America).  Susan Franck, The ICSID Effect? Considering 
Potential Variations in Arbitration Awards, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 825, 913 (2011). 
95 Among the sources they rely on are:  RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING 
LAW (1995) (criticizing originalism in favor of a mixture of liberalism, pragmatism, 
and economics); GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL 
BEHAVIOR (1959) (exploring bloc voting among Supreme Court justices, the 
justices’ incentives to vote in such blocs, and the consistency of the justices’ 
stances on recurring topics); Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. 
Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case 
Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 281 (1995) (“In the mass of cases that are filed . . . 
the law—not the judge—dominates the outcomes.”); Michael A. Bailey & Forrest 
Maltzman, Does Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 102 AM. J. POL. SCI., 369 (2008) (determining that law can play 
an important role in a judge’s opinion, as demonstrated by statistical analyses into 
stare decisis, deference to Congress, and protection of speech); William N. 
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to ICSID case outcome, focusing on decisions on jurisdiction and 
host state liability.  Relevant for the purposes of this article are the 
following hypotheses:  (1) “Arbitrators who are pro-investor will 
tend to vote in favor of affirming jurisdiction and liability of host 
states.  Conversely, arbitrators who are pro-state are more likely to 
favor the host state;”96 (2):  
Arbitrators who judge the actions of host countries that 
belong to the same legal family will tend to assert 
jurisdiction less often and hold the host state liable on fewer 
occasions.  Conversely, when arbitrators judge the actions 
of a host country belonging to a different legal family, they 
will be more likely to affirm jurisdiction and hold the host 
state liable;97  
and (3) “Arbitrators from developing countries are less likely to 
hold the host country liable because they are more familiar with 
                                                     
Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L. J. 
331, 334 (1991) (asserting that Congress is most likely to override the Supreme 
Court’s statutory decisions when the Court is ideologically fragmented, “relies on 
the text’s plain meaning and ignores legislative signals, and/or rejects positions 
taken by federal, state, or local governments”); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior 
on the United States Court of Appeals, 1961–1964, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 374, 379 
(1966) (detailing the voting behavior of judges and how their political leanings 
may play a part); Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the 
Standing Doctrine? An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 
STAN. L. REV. (2010) (contending that liberal justices created the standing doctrine 
so that administrative agencies would not be subject to judicial review); Stuart S. 
Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges’ Decisions, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 843, 844 
(1961) (revealing data comparing judges’ decisions and political party lines); C. 
Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946–1978, 75 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 355, 366 (1981) (identifying personal attributes among judges, such as 
appointing president, past legal experience, and prestige of pre-law education, 
and concluding that their “influence . . . is transmitted directly and powerfully to 
judicial voting behavior”); Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona, All the President’s 
Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan’s Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 766, 767 (1987) (assessing the conservatism of Reagan-appointed 
judges and finding that “Reagan judges are not significantly more conservative 
than their Republican colleagues”).  Most notably, they cite DAVID W. RHODE & 
HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 72 (1976) (noting that “judges 
base their decisions solely upon personal policy preferences”); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & 
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 64, 86 (1993) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court decides disputes before it in light of the facts of the case 
vis-à-vis precedent, the plain meaning of the Constitution and statutes, the intent 
of the framers, and a balancing of societal versus constitutional interests.”).      
96 Waibel & Wu Study, supra note 17, at 21. 
97 Id. at 22–23. 
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the economic and social conditions in developing countries and 
host countries[,] the more likely source of future arbitral 
appointments.”98 
The first hypothesis is almost a restatement of the obvious:  a 
decision maker’s ideological leanings impact his decisions.  
Property rights are a subject of serious ideology controversy.  As 
discussed at length above, the ideological divide is enduring.  
Although the study used proxies as indicators of the ideological 
leanings of the arbitrators,99 the finding is not surprising because it 
is clear that the parties spend significant amounts of time and 
resources in selecting arbitrators who are likely to be ideologically 
sympathetic to their side. 
The second proposition is also not surprising because of the 
inherent human inclination to understand and appreciate the 
familiar.  The third proposition, likewise, is not surprising for the 
same reasons, that is, familiarity and understanding of the 
circumstances. 
The above-noted studies share the same characteristics; 
however, they all avoid the most fundamental question of the 
impact of the diversity deficit on outcome.  Stated differently, what 
is the overall price of the cultural barrier that the Africans face 
when appearing before tribunals composed largely of Western 
arbitrators represented by counsel and firms who must necessarily 
share the judges’ cultural backgrounds?  It might be impossible to 
empirically measure the cost or explicate the barrier, but the 
remainder of this article attempts to assess how African states have 
fared in the last half-century by looking at the available data and 
reviewing selected cases.  Before that is provided, however, it is 
important to look at the historical background to understand why 
Africa signed on to this project and how that might affect its 
continued use of ICSID with its new partners—a framework 
arguably designed for a different purpose.  
3. AFRICA’S ICSID STORY:  A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Prior to the adoption of the text of the Convention, the World 
Bank conducted extensive consultations with various stakeholders 
from Africa to South America.  Fortunately, ICSID has made 
                                                     
98 Id. at 23. 
99 Id. at 22.  The proxy is not a perfect one—they use frequency of 
appointment by one party or the other as an indication of the political leanings as 
pro-investor or pro-state.  Id. at 34–40. 
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summaries of the records available in multiple volumes under the 
title History of the Convention.100  This section relies on these 
volumes for the discussion of the raison d’être as understood by 
the Africans and the dilemmas they faced. 
3.1. Africa’s Position on the Doctrinal Debate 
A fundamental doctrinal dilemma underpins the law of 
international investment.101  Its cogent articulation may be traced 
back to the famous 1938 exchange of letters between U.S. Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull and the Mexican Foreign Ministry, prompted 
by Mexico’s seizure of agrarian property belonging to American 
citizens.  These exchanges are highly instructive—Mr. Hull wrote: 
The taking of property without compensation is not 
expropriation.  It is confiscation. . . . . We cannot question 
the right of a foreign government to treat its own nationals 
in this fashion if it so desires.  This is a matter of domestic 
concern.  But we cannot admit that a foreign government 
may take the property of American nationals in disregard 
of the rule of compensation under international law.  Nor 
can we admit that any government unilaterally and 
through its municipal legislation can, as in this instant case, 
nullify this universally accepted principle of international 
law, based as it is on reason, equity and justice. . . . . The 
right of prompt and just compensation for expropriated 
property is a part of this [international legal] structure.102 
The response of the Mexican Minster of Foreign Affairs was 
equally fascinating: 
My Government maintains . . . [that] there does not exist in 
international law any principle universally accepted by 
countries, nor by the writers of treatises on this subject, that 
would render obligatory the giving of adequate 
compensation for expropriations of a general and 
                                                     
100 HISTORY OF ICSID, supra note 8. 
101 The Law of International Investment refers to a set of procedural and 
substantive rules that generally govern the relationship between the foreign 
investor, the state of the investor’s nationality, and the host state.  THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 6 (Peter Muchlinski, Frederico 
Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008). 
102 Letter from Cordell Hull, U.S. Secretary of State, to Mex. Ambassador to 
the U.S. (July 21, 1938), excerpted in LOWENFELD, supra note 3, at 476. 
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impersonal character.  Nevertheless, Mexico admits, in 
obedience to her own laws, that she is indeed under 
obligation to indemnify in an adequate manner; but the 
doctrine which she maintains on the subject, which is based 
on the most authoritative opinions of writers of treatises on 
international law, is that the time and manner of such 
payment must be determined by her own laws.103 
This classic adaptation of what is popularly known as the 
Calvo doctrine undoubtedly provided the philosophical impetus 
for the initial unanimous rejection of the idea of a World Bank 
affiliated supranational arbitral body by the South American 
countries.104  When the ICSID proposal was presented at the annual 
meeting of the Bank in Tokyo in 1964, all South American states 
voted “no” prompting the Latin press to famously tout “El No de 
Tokyo.”105  A World Bank affiliated commentator aptly 
characterized it as the “Calvoesque rejection of foreign 
intervention.”106 
The Bank’s exchanges with the South American jurists during 
one of the legal consultative meetings in June 1964 provide 
valuable insight as to where they stood on the philosophical 
question and in fact offer good contrast with the African jurists’ 
position discussed below.  The discussion was led by the then-
World Bank General Counsel Aron Broches, who later became the 
first Secretary General of ICSID, subsequently serving in that 
capacity for thirteen years.107 
On the afternoon of Monday, February 3, 1964, Mr. Broches 
opened the first session of the consultative meeting in Santiago, 
Chile.  The first reaction he received was the following seemingly 
                                                     
103 Letter from Mex. Minister of Foreign Affairs to U.S. Ambassador (Aug. 3, 
1938), excerpted in LOWENFELD, supra note 3, at 477.  
104 Id. at 540. 
105 Id.  
106 Paul C. Szasz, The Investment Disputes Convention and Latin America, 11 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 256, 259 (1971).  Although there are other related reasons for the Latin 
American countries’ rejection of the idea, it is clear that the dominant reason was 
one derived from the Calvo doctrine:  “that the Convention, which of course can 
be used only in relation to an alien investor, offends against the rule that 
foreigners must be treated equally with citizens.”  Id. at 261 (citing José R. 
Chiriboga, International Arbitration, 4 INT’L LAW 801, 804 (1970)).  
107 Aron Broches Retires as Vice President and General Counsel, THE WORLD BANK, 
http://go.worldbank.org/JDT8LQZ890 (last visited Mar. 18, 2013). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
01_KIDANE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2014  3:06 AM 
582 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 35:3 
supportive statement by the representative of the Chilean 
Government, Mr. Brunner: 
[T]he draft convention touched on novel problems and 
concepts in the field of international law in giving 
individuals direct access to States before international 
tribunals.  The most enlightened jurists had long denied 
that only States could be subjects of international law . . . . 
Direct access of individuals to an international jurisdiction 
which was found in the Statute of the Central American 
Court of Justice and had been acquiring increasing 
importance in the European Economic Community was 
being projected upon the world plane through the initiative 
of the International Bank.108 
As the day progressed, stronger opinions were expressed.  Mr. 
Ribeiro of Brazil made the following classic Calvoesquian 
statement:  “[D]espite the optional character of the draft 
Convention, foreign investors would be granted a legally 
privileged position, in violation of the principle of full equality 
before the law.”109  Similarly, Mr. Escobar of Bolivia said:   
[T]he sovereignty of States could not be subordinated to the 
authority of an international institution without being 
seriously impaired. . . those responsible for preparing the 
draft had failed to appreciate its adverse effects.  Thus the 
Bank itself seemed to be displaying a lack of confidence in 
the institutions of the countries wishing to attract foreign 
capital.110   
Having made that statement, he finally urged the Bank to abandon 
the idea altogether.111 
Another salient issue that the South American experts raised 
was the proposed affiliation of the Centre with the World Bank 
and, related to that, its location at the Headquarters of the Bank in 
Washington, D.C.  Some experts suggested that it be allowed to 
                                                     
108 HISTORY OF ICSID, supra note 8, at 305.  Note that this statement is a 
summary contained in the report.  It is not an exact transcription of the delegate’s 
statements. 
109 Id. at 306. 
110 Id. at 308. 
111 Id. 
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function in the country where the dispute arose.112  Responding to 
these types of concerns, the chair said that if the affiliation of the 
Centre with the Bank were agreed upon, its location would be of 
secondary importance, and “should be decided on grounds of 
practicability.”113 
Despite Mr. Broches’ able chairmanship and great efforts to 
convince, the negative sentiment dominated the entire consultative 
process, explaining the nearly universal rejection of the idea by the 
South American states. 
Commentators later criticized the rejection.  According to 
Szasz, for example, “[T]he Centre, as an international institution in 
which all Contracting States participate equally, must not be 
considered as a foreign power of the type against which the Latin 
Americans had for generations girded themselves.”114  In an effort 
to encourage the South American countries to accept the 
Convention, the same commentator warned that they were in 
competition with “capital-hungry and more flexible States.”115  
Although there is no reference to specific countries, it is clear that 
the reference was made to African countries, which 
overwhelmingly accepted the Convention with enthusiasm from 
the very beginning.  What then explains such a radically different 
approach by two capital receiving continents with relatively 
similar colonial experience?  Did they have differing philosophical 
understandings?  Where did Africa stand on the Hull-Calvo 
debate? 
Former International Court of Justice President, Judge T.O. 
Elias expresses the dominant customary African conception of the 
ownership of land as:  “I conceive that land belongs to a vast 
family of which many are dead, few are living, and countless 
members are unborn.”116  He notes that these conceptions are 
largely shared across many African societies.117  Although the 
expression suggests some form of communalism, individual 
possessory rights are recognized.  Such rights were almost 
                                                     
112 Id. at 312–13 (statement of Mr. Salazar, representative of Ecuador). 
113 Id. at 313 (statement of Mr. Broches, the Chairman). 
114 Szasz, supra note 106, at 259.  
115 Id. at 265. 
116 T. OLAWALE ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 162 (1956) 
(quoting a statement made by a Nigerian chief to the West African Lands 
Committee in 1912). 
117 Id. at n.1 and accompanying text. 
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indistinguishable from the concept of fee simple absolute under 
common law, except, unlike the Crown in England, the African 
customary chiefs never had a claim of ownership of all land and 
never considered all inhabitants their tenants.118  The chief “enjoys 
only an administrative right of supervisory oversight of the land 
for the benefit of the whole community.”119  Judge Elias 
characterizes the African customary land tenure system as 
“primitive communism” and describes the rights and 
responsibilities of the individual and the group.120  Professor Lesley 
Obiora’s account of the conditions of alienability of property is 
instructive.  She writes:  “Members of a family, irrespective of sex, 
were entitled to occupancy and user rights subject to good 
behavior.  While rights accruing via citizenship could not be ceded 
any more than citizenship on which they rested, persons could 
transfer their interest in land that they improved.”121  More 
importantly, however: 
[T]here was a practical restraint on alienation insofar as the 
transferee had to be someone acceptable to the local 
community because the spatial proximity and the 
conditions of production meant that the transferee 
invariably associated with and was incorporated into the 
community.  In this sense, political affiliation modified 
particular rights based on creative preemption.122   
 
It is clear, however, that the land and property ownership regime 
under African customary law—although replete with 
inconsistencies across the various societies—had solid and 
sophisticated philosophical foundations and less solicitous of more 
rights for outsiders.123 
                                                     
118 Id. at 164. 
119 Id. at 164-65. 
120 Id. at 83–92. 
121 L. Amede Obiora, Remapping the Domain of Property in Africa, 12 U. FLA. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 57, 60–61 (2000) (citing Elizabeth Colson, The Colonial Period and land 
Rights in COLONIALISM IN AFRICA 1870–1960: VOL. 3, PROFILES OF CHANGE: AFRICAN 
SOCIETIES AND COLONIAL RULE 197, 200 (Peter Duigan, L.H. Gann & Victor Turner 
eds., 1971); ELIAS, supra note 116, at 167). 
122 Obiora, supra note 121, at 60. 
123 1 READINGS IN AFRICAN LAW 356, 356–90 (Eugene Cotran & N.N. Rubin 
eds., 1970).  
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As fate would have it, however, with the advent of colonialism, 
the philosophical foundations of the African notions of property 
and the modes and hierarchy of its allocation were “distort[ed]” 
and “disoriented.”124  It is evident that “[c]olonial officials assumed 
that land must have an owner exercising a full range of rights 
parallel to those covered by the European concept of proprietary 
ownership.”125  As Professor Obiora further notes, “[t]he 
development of new forms of property and technologies of 
production, the possibilities of individual acquisition, the 
acculturation of different values, reworked patterns of 
consumption and the like, redefined the socio-economic terrain.”126  
Upon independence, most African countries sought refuge in the 
communist ideologies of the Soviet Union (USSR), and latterly, the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC).127  These ideologies have an 
unwavering stance on ownership of property.  Marxism, the 
essential philosophical foundation, holds that private ownership of 
property enables the “exploitation of man by man.”128  It makes no 
distinction between citizens and aliens.  If the philosophical 
foundations of the time were seemingly more aligned with the 
Calvo doctrine, what then allured the African states into instantly 
accepting ICSID?  Examination of the history might shed some 
light.     
3.2. Why Did African States Accept ICSID? 
The historical record clearly indicates that the only reason that 
the African states accepted ICSID is because they thought that they 
had to do so in order to attract private foreign investment to 
                                                     
124 RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 
TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW, 562 (3d ed. 1985).  
Although Professors David and Brierley say this in the broader context of the 
impact of colonial legal systems on African customary law, it is clear that the fate 
of the law of property was the same.   
125 Obiora, supra note 121, at 62. 
126 Id. at 66. 
127 Beverly I. Moran, Homogenized Law: Can the United States Learn From 
African Mistakes?, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 361, 367 (2001) (citing MICHAEL HODD, 
THE ECONOMIES OF AFRICA 34-35 (1991)).  For a fuller discussion of Africa’s 
relationship with the USSR and PRC, see SOVIET AND CHINESE AID TO AFRICAN 
NATIONS (Warren Weinstein & Thomas H. Henriksen eds., 1980).  For a detailed 
description of China’s involvement with the African nations, see ALAN 
HUTCHINSON, CHINA’S AFRICAN REVOLUTION (1975).  
128 KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 172 (1948). 
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develop their ailing post-colonial economies.129  Consider the 
summary of recorded proceedings of the African legal consultative 
meeting that took place in Addis Ababa between December 16 and 
20 in 1963.130  This meeting was also chaired by World Bank 
General Counsel Broches.131  It focused on at least four aspects of 
the proposal:  (1) purpose and justification, (2) jurisdiction, (3) 
affiliation and location, and (4) panels.132  Each is discussed briefly 
as follows: 
3.2.1. Purpose and Justification 
The historical record is unambiguous on this point.  It suggests 
that the participating African legal experts overwhelmingly 
believed that a reputable international dispute settlement 
mechanism would alleviate Africa’s problem of attracting foreign 
investment.  For example, the Executive Secretary of the Economic 
Commission for Africa, in a statement he made at the beginning of 
the meeting, said that:  
[P]rivate capital was not moving in sufficient volume to 
areas in need of capital, one of the most serious 
impediments to its flow [was] the fear of investors that their 
investment would be exposed to political risks such as 
outright expropriation. . . .  The Bank had therefore been 
led to wonder whether, in view of its reputation for 
integrity and its position of impartiality, it could not help in 
removing that obstacle to private investment.133   
The representatives of almost all of the twenty-nine states present 
in that meeting echoed that sentiment while raising some concerns 
about the jurisdiction, affiliation, location, and composition of 
panels.134  The record interestingly shows that one of the vocal 
supporters of the initiative was Judge T.O. Elias, who was then a 
young representative of the Nigerian Government many years 
                                                     
129 See HISTORY OF ICSID, supra note 8, at 236 (summarizing a statement by the 
Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa calling for a legal 
regime to promote private foreign investment). 
130 Id. at 236–98.  
131 Id. at 236. 
132 See infra notes 133–56 and accompanying text (providing a detailed 
summary of the delegates’ discussion of these four areas).  
133 Id. at 240.  
134 Id. at 243–98.  
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before he ascended to the presidency of the International Court of 
Justice.135 
3.2.2. Jurisdiction (Powers and Functions of the Centre) 
Objections were raised on the most fundamental question of 
standing of a private investor to proceed against a sovereign state 
in an arbitral forum.136  Questions were also raised in connection 
with the complexities of dual nationality, i.e., whether a person 
including a juridical person having the nationality of the host state 
as well as another Contracting State may avail herself/itself of the 
benefits of the Convention.137  A more serious objection to the 
jurisdiction of the Centre came from the representatives of 
Cameroon and Tunisia, who said that if a state expropriates 
property of a foreign investor in the public interest, “the only 
question that could be submitted to the Centre [should be the] 
adequacy of [the] compensation.”138  Related to this, the 
representative from Cameroon asked, “where the parties had 
undertaken to have recourse to arbitration without specifying the 
law to be applied . . . would the tribunal be competent to decide 
upon the legality of such a sovereign act, and if so, by reference to 
which system of law?”139  Although these objections mirror the 
objections of the South American bloc, they were not raised so 
vigorously and widely enough as to result in the majority’s 
rejection of the idea.140 
3.2.3. Affiliation and Location 
Although the idea that the Centre’s affiliation with the Bank 
would give it appropriate prestige has not been disputed, concerns 
were raised with respect to the role of the President of the Bank as 
the chair of the Administrative Council and the location of the 
                                                     
135 Id. at 244 (“In the opinion of his Government the document represented an 
attempt not only to restore the confidence of the investor but also to codify certain 
principles of customary law and to engage in the progressive development of 
international law, and he warmly recommended it.”). 
136 Id. at 256 (“[T]he effect of Article II, Section 1 would be to place nationals 
on a par with States.  That represented a departure from customary international 
law and was a step which should not be taken lightly.”).  
137 Id. at 256–57.  
138 Id. at 259.  
139 Id. at 267.  
140 See supra Section 3.1 (discussing the objections of South American 
countries to ICSID). 
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Centre at the headquarters of the Bank in Washington, D.C.  For 
example, one representative noted, “while the connection of the 
Center with the Bank would give the Center added prestige, the 
intention was nonetheless to create an independent body.  It might 
therefore be desirable to indicate at the outset . . . that the seat of 
the Center could be transferred to another location.”141  Similarly, 
another delegate questioned the appropriateness of the 
appointment of the President of the Bank as the chair of the 
Administrative Council.  He noted in particular that “certain 
countries might not wish to include an arbitration clause in the 
possible arrangements owing to the preponderant role of the 
Chairman in the functioning” and inquired “whether it would not 
be possible to transfer some of the functions at present vested in 
the Chairman to some other person or body.”142  The Bank’s 
response to this inquiry was that “the draft Convention had been 
drawn upon the assumption that the link with the International 
Bank was considered beneficial and that the President of the Bank 
was recognized to be a suitable person for the functions vested in 
him.”143 
As far as the place of the proceedings was concerned, at least 
two views were expressed:  leaving the designation of the place to 
the Administrative Council or leaving the choice to the parties, 
with the understanding that the arbitral tribunal would pick the 
location if the parties failed to agree, similar to most commercial 
arbitral rules.144  The final text provided that the “proceeding shall 
be held at the seat of the Centre.”145  Exceptions included the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague, any other 
facilities with which the Centre had made arrangements, and other 
places “approved by the Commission or Tribunal after 
consultation with the Secretary-General.”146 
                                                     
141 Id. at 248 (statement of the representative of United Arab Republic, Mr. 
Moustafa).  
142 Id. (statement of the representative of Sierra Leone, Mr. Macaulay).  
143 Id. (statement of Mr. Broches, General Counsel of the Bank who chaired 
the meeting). 
144 Id. at 278 (statements of Mr. Elias of Nigeria and Mr. Macaulay of Sierra 
Leone). 
145 ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at art. 62. 
146 Id. at art. 63.  
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3.2.4. Panels /Arbitrators 
The discussion on the panels and selection of arbitrators 
focused on at least two major points:  qualifications and diversity 
of nationality.  The African experts repeatedly emphasized the 
need for appointing persons with appropriate expertise in the field 
of international arbitration.  For example, the representative of 
Dahomey (now the Republic of Benin) urged that the 
Administrative Council should make sure that the arbitrators it 
appoints are “technically competent.”147  Similarly, Mr. Elias of 
Nigeria suggested that: 
if the parties to a dispute were to be given the freedom to 
appoint to a tribunal or commission persons from outside 
the Panels, that freedom should be qualified by a 
requirement that the persons so appointed should not be of 
a quality inferior to those designated to the Panels [by the 
President of the Bank].148 
Once the idea of the constitution of a panel of experts from 
which arbitrators would be drawn for each case, either by 
appointment or party choice, had been agreed to, a heated 
discussion ensued on the question of disqualification of arbitrators.  
The draft provided that arbitrators appointed by the Chairman 
(World Bank President) may only be challenged based on facts that 
have occurred subsequent to the appointment, while party-selected 
arbitrators may be challenged and disqualified on the basis of “any 
fact antecedent or subsequent to their appointment.”149  Because of 
the vigorous resistance to the idea of giving the Chairman’s 
appointees a privileged position with respect to challenge and 
disqualification, the Chair of the meeting took note and said that 
he would seek further opinion in subsequent deliberation with 
                                                     
147 HISTORY OF ICSID, supra note 8, at 245.  
148 Id. at 265.  
149 Id. at 276 (statements of Mr. Macaulay representative of Sierra Leone) 
(“[I]f, for example, an arbitrator appointed by the Chairman were challenged on 
grounds that he had a personal interest in the matter in dispute, the Chairman 
would be entitled to say that he had known of that interest but had not considered 
it a valid objection to his appointment, and his decision would be 
unchallengeable.  It is not a matter of questioning the Chairman’s integrity but his 
judgment.”). 
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various stakeholders.150  The final version did indeed abandon 
such privileged treatment.151 
The importance of prohibiting arbitrators with the nationality 
of the disputing parties also raised a controversy.  The most 
appealing opposition to the idea came from Mr. Moustafa of Egypt 
(then called the United Arab Republic).  He noted in particular that 
“An arbitrator of the same nationality as the party to the dispute was 
more likely to understand the issues involved and to be in a better position 
to offer the necessary explanations; he might even make an unfavorable 
award more acceptable.”152  He seriously questioned the exact reason 
why nationality could exclude an otherwise qualified arbitrator.  
The record shows that the chair did not answer this question 
satisfactorily but simple said that he personally favored the 
exclusion approach.153  The final text also disregarded the idea of 
the cultural competence of the arbitrators.  It indeed maintained 
the idea that arbitrators appointed by the Chair when the parties 
fail to agree “shall not be nationals of the Contracting State party to 
the dispute or of the Contracting State whose national is a party to 
the dispute.”154  Although the merits of this approach might be 
debatable, the final text’s entire omission of the cultural 
competence of arbitrators is worth noting.  As a prelude to the 
discussions that follow, it is important to take note of the exact 
arbitrator qualifications that the Convention provides in Article 14: 
(1) Persons designated to serve on the Panels shall be 
persons of high moral character and recognized 
competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or 
finance, who may be relied upon to exercise independent 
judgment. Competence in the field of law shall be of 
particular importance in the case of persons on the Panel of 
Arbitrators. 
(2) The Chairman, in designating persons to serve on the 
Panels, shall in addition pay due regard to the importance 
of assuring representation on the Panels of the principal 
                                                     
150 Id. at 276 (statement of Mr. Broches, Chair of the meeting).   
151 ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 56–58.  
152 HISTORY OF ICSID, supra note 8, at 266 (emphasis added). 
153 Id.  
154 ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at art. 38. 
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legal systems of the world and of the main forms of 
economic activity.155 
It is important to note that the required qualifications are 
limited to good moral character, technical competence, and 
impartiality.156  It is also worth noting that the requirements of 
diversity in subsection (2) are limited to legal systems and 
economic activity.    
4. REVIEW OF THE AFRICA SPECIFIC DATASET: QUANTITATIVE 
INDICATORS157 
As of this writing, the ICSID database contains sixty-four 
completed cases involving at least one African state as the 
respondent.  The data is broken down as follows: 
4.1. Arbitrator Nationality 
Of the sixty-four completed cases, sixty-one provide arbitrator 
nationality.  The data shows that the pool of arbitrators in these 
cases consisted primarily of Europeans.  Of the cases analyzed, 
fifty-nine percent of the arbitrators of initial case submissions were 
European.  Europeans were appointed presidents of tribunals of 
initial case submissions in forty-three of the sixty-one cases, which 
is roughly seventy percent of the cases.  In the cases where 
annulment proceedings commenced, twenty-four European 
arbitrators were on panels of Ad Hoc committees for the 
annulment proceedings.  Europeans were appointed presidents of 
Ad Hoc committees in ten of the fourteen annulment proceedings, 
roughly seventy percent of the proceedings. 
North America was the second most represented region.  North 
American arbitrators made up fourteen percent of the panels of 
initial case submissions.  North Americans were appointed 
presidents of four tribunals of initial case submissions, which is 
roughly six percent of the cases.  Four North American arbitrators 
were on panels of Ad Hoc committee for annulment proceedings 
and three North Americans were appointed president of Ad Hoc 
committees, which is roughly twenty-one percent of the 
committees. 
                                                     
155 Id. at art. 14.  
156 Id.  
157 The statistical analysis included in this section is entirely based on data 
available on the ICSID website.  ICSID Cases, ICSID, supra note 68. 
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African representation on panels was close behind that of 
North America, with African arbitrators making up twelve percent 
of the panels of initial case submissions.  Africans were appointed 
presidents of two tribunals of initial case submissions, which is 
roughly three percent of the cases.  Eight African arbitrators were 
on panels of Ad Hoc committees for annulment proceedings. 
 Arbitrators from South America made up five percent of the 
panels of initial case submissions.  South Americans were 
appointed presidents of six tribunals, roughly ten percent.  Three 
South American arbitrators were on panels of Ad Hoc committees 
for annulment proceedings 
Arbitrators from the Australia region made up three percent of 
the panels of initial case submissions.  Arbitrators from the 
Australia region headed two tribunals, one as president and one as 
sole arbitrator (CDC Group v. Republic of Seychelles 
(ARB/02/14)).158  Two arbitrators from the Australia region were 
on panels of Ad Hoc committees for annulment proceedings. 
 Arbitrators from Asia and the Middle East made up three 
percent of the panels of initial case submissions.  An arbitrator 
from the Asia/Middle East region was appointed president of one 
tribunal.  Three arbitrators from Asia and the Middle East were on 
panels of Ad Hoc committees for annulment proceedings and one 
was appointed president of the Ad Hoc committee. The following 
chart demonstrates these statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
158 For a breakdown of the arbitrators in this case, see List of Concluded Cases: 
107. CDC Group plc v. Republic of Seycehelles (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14), ICSID, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH
&actionVal=ListConcluded (last updated Feb. 28, 2014). 
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Figure 1 
 
4.2. Counsel Nationality 
The nationality of counsel representing the African states in 
these proceedings is provided in thirty-two of sixty-four cases.  
While in sixteen percent and twenty-two percent of these cases, the 
respondent states were represented by exclusively African and 
exclusively European counsel respectively, in the great majority of 
cases—i.e., sixty-two percent of the cases—the African states were 
represented by counsels composed of different nationalities 
including the specific African respondent state, European, 
American, and Australian. 
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Figure 2 
 
4.3. Claimant Nationality 
In forty-two of the sixty-four cases, the publicly available data 
provides the nationality of the claimants.  The majority of the 
claimants were from Europe, i.e., fifty-five percent with an 
additional ten percent representing a joint venture of European 
and North American investors.  In an additional nineteen percent 
of the cases, European investors collaborated with African 
investors, and in seven percent of the cases North American 
investors collaborated with African investors.  Only five percent 
and two percent of the cases involved exclusively Asian and 
African investors, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/1
01_KIDANE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2014  3:06 AM 
2014] THE CHINA-AFRICA FACTOR 595 
Figure 3 
 
4.4. Location 
The location of the arbitration (meaning the location of the 
actual hearing) is indicated in thirty-eight of the sixty-four cases.  
In eighty-five percent of the initial case submissions, hearings took 
place in Europe exclusively with an additional thirteen percent of 
the initial case submissions holding hearings in Europe along with 
another location.  North America was the hearing location for two 
percent of the initial case submissions.  No case was heard in 
Africa. 
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Figure 4 
 
 
The data is thus unambiguous:  African states routinely 
arbitrate cases with private investors almost exclusively in 
Washington, D.C., Paris, or London before three Western 
arbitrators and represented by Western law firms.  They obviously 
spend a lot of money.  What is the nature of the justice that they 
buy in Washington, Paris, or London? 
4.5. Outcome on Jurisdiction 
Outcome on jurisdictional challenges is indicated in thirty-
seven of the sixty-four cases. A basis for jurisdiction was found in 
seventy-four percent of the cases, while thirteen percent of the 
cases found no basis for jurisdiction.  Mixed outcomes on 
jurisdiction occurred in thirteen percent of the cases. 
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Figure 5 
 
4.6. Outcome on the Merits 
Outcome on the merits of the case is indicated in thirty-four of 
the sixty-four cases.  In forty-four percent of the cases, investor 
claims were rejected, while forty-one percent of the cases found the 
respondent state liable.  Another fifteen percent of the cases had a 
mixed outcome.  As shown in the following chart, the outcome on 
the merits is fairly balanced. 
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Figure 6 
 
4.7. Allocation of Cost 
Cost allocation is indicated in thirty-four of the sixty-four cases.  
In all but seven cases, the cost was split, i.e., each party was 
required to cover its own expenses and pay half of the costs of the 
tribunal.  In six of the remaining seven cases, the respondent state 
was required to pay all or some parts of the claimant’s costs.  In 
one case the parties were required to pay their own expenses, but 
the respondent state was required to pay tribunal’s costs, but that 
was included in the split category in the chart below.  The investor-
claimant was required to pay the respondent state’s costs in only 
one case. 
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Figure 7 
 
5. THE VIRTUES OF ARISTOCRATIC JUSTICE 
The study described above shows that in the last half-century, 
African states defended investment claims in Europe and the 
United States, and prevailed on the merits in about half of the 
cases.  The data also shows that ICSID tribunals found jurisdiction 
in the overwhelming majority of cases.  It also shows that no 
matter who prevailed, the tribunals allocated costs evenly in the 
great majority of cases and awarded costs to the respondent state 
in only one case.  This obviously paints a more complicated picture 
and invites deeper inquiry; the following sections make such 
attempt. 
5.1. Who Are the “Virtuous” Men? 
In their groundbreaking work, Dealing in Virtue, Professors 
Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth equate virtue with “symbolic 
capital”: 
 
Only a very select and elite group of individuals is able to 
serve as international arbitrators.  They are purportedly 
selected for their ‘virtue’—judgment, neutrality, 
expertise—yet rewarded as if they are participants in 
international deal making.  In more sociological terms, the 
symbolic capital acquired through a career of public service 
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or scholarship is translated into a substantial cash value in 
international arbitration.159 
 
They state that this “symbolic capital” can be arbitrarily 
acquired160 and go on to make a historical comparison: 
The careers of these noble individuals recall accounts of the 
medieval church.  The son of a nobleman could become a 
bishop of the church simply because of family background 
and social prominence.  Others would shave their heads, 
take vows of celibacy, devote everything to the church, and 
yet have no chance to rise to a position of eminence, such as 
bishop.  Their hard work would help maintain the 
institutional structure that made the position of bishop 
attractive to the son of a nobleman, but they lacked the 
social platform to gain the top position.161  
So how is this related to a career in arbitration?  They continue 
to write:   
There is similar phenomenon in arbitration.  Without a 
suitable platform, defined now as more than social class 
(which is nevertheless useful), the arbitration devotee can 
never get selected as an arbitrator.  There are individuals 
who, for example, teach at low-prestige schools, work in 
unknown law firms, or produce scholarship that is deemed 
to be too marginal, who cannot gain access to this world no 
matter how much they write, attend conferences, or in 
general profess the faith.  Others need not even profess the 
faith or write about arbitration to enter the field more or 
less at the top.162 
So, who are these noble men?  A generic description of their 
qualifications may read something like “academic standing, 
scholarly publication, particular kinds of practical experience, 
training in alternative dispute resolution, connections to business, 
connections to political power, particular language skills, [and] 
                                                     
159 YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDER 8 (1996). 
160 Id. at 18.  
161 Id. at 23. 
162 Id.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/1
01_KIDANE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2014  3:06 AM 
2014] THE CHINA-AFRICA FACTOR 601 
proficiency in technical aspects of arbitration practice.”163  More 
importantly, “the weight of different agents depends on their 
symbolic capital, i.e., on the recognition, institutionalized or not, 
that they receive from a group.”164   
Consider the “five-million-pound man,” Swiss arbitrator Pierre 
Lalive.165  The media report exaggerated the fee he charged in the 
Westland case.  It was not quite five-million pounds, but rather 
4,697,258 British Pounds.166  Lalive’s judgment may or may not be 
worth that much, similar to many professional services that 
consumers purchase on the marketplace,167 but Dezalay and Garth 
use his career path to exemplify what it takes to join the aristocratic 
club:  together with his renowned older brother, Lalive is a partner 
at the Lalive Law firm in Geneva; has written many books and 
articles; possessed an academic appointment in Geneva; taught at 
Columbia, Cambridge, the University of Brussels, and the Hague 
Academy of International Law; and served as president of the 
ICC’s Institute of Business Law and Practice, a member of the 
London Court of International Arbitration, and president of the 
Swiss Arbitration Association.168 
Although the arbitration field is still dominated by persons of 
this caliber, today’s career path is probably more like Jan 
Paulsson’s, whom Dezalay and Garth say is “the closest equivalent 
in his generation to Pierre Lalive of the older generation.”169  
Consider Paulsson’s ticket to prominence: multi-cultural 
upbringing (a son of Swedish missionaries, and grew up in 
Liberia), excellent academic credentials (Harvard College and Yale 
Law), early practice exposure to international arbitration, sustained 
                                                     
163 Id. at 19. 
164 Id. at 18 (quoting PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOIC J. D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION 
TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 119 (1992)) (emphasis omitted).  
165 Id. at 19 n.3 (citing Jeremy Edwards, The Five-Million Pound Man, LEGAL 
BUSINESS, Nov. 1994, at 46–49).  Lalive obtained such a large fee from the Westland 
Helicopters Ltd. v. Arab Organisations for Industrialisation case involving hundreds of 
millions.  For a discussion of this case, see Justice Colman, Westland Helicopters Ltd 
v. Arab Organisations for Industrialisation, 10 ARAB L. Q. 115–43 (1995). 
166 DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 159, at 19 n.3.  
167 Note the similarity of this with the recent debate on Wall Street executive 
compensation.  See Frank Ahrens, Isn’t That Rich?  The Bonus Controversy of 2009, 
WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/opinions/ 
outlook-bonus/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (compiling opinions of politicians and 
chief executives on the fairness of Wall Street bonuses). 
168 DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 159, at 20.   
169 Id. at 24. 
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high-quality scholarly production and a great platform as a partner 
at one of the world’s most prominent international arbitration 
firms, and as a professor at an American law school.170  Everything 
is just right.  That is how the virtue is acquired and maintained.  
Indeed, to use Professor Salacuse’s characterization, these experts 
are members of an “epistemic community” with the ability to 
influence policy and shape jurisprudence.171 
5.2. Why Do the Africans Appoint the Virtuous Men? 
Simply stated, these men are evidently appointed because of 
their virtue.  Africa is certainly under no obligation to appoint 
them as arbitrators or counsel.  Consider this true statement:  
Overall, who the arbitrator is in terms of expertise and prior 
experience is the most important single factor in both the 
decisional and the consensus processes.  Who he or she is 
determines the availability of both substantive and fact 
finding norms, conditions the procedural and role norms 
that are held, and raises or lowers the degree of influence in 
interaction with other arbitrators. 172   
This is often expressed—similar to the well-known real estate 
maxim—as “arbitrator, arbitrator, arbitrator.” 173 
                                                     
170 Id.  For Paulsson’s current biography, see also Governing Board, ICCA, 
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/about/governing-board/President/Jan_ 
Paulsson.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2014). 
171 Salacuse, supra note 3, at 465–67 (noting that “[s]ince the movement to 
negotiate investment treaties began, the epistemic community of international 
lawyers, scholars, jurists, and arbitrators has, through their advising, writing, 
advocacy, and judicial, and arbitral decisions, shaped the regime” of international 
investment,” and noting further that to the extent there is coherence in the regime, 
it could be attributed to the similarity in the backgrounds of the members of the 
epistemic community who are mainly Western).  Salacuse cites to the ICSID 
database which shows forty-three percent of arbitrators appointed so far being 
from only five countries, the United States (120), France (106), Britain (94), Canada 
(75), and Switzerland (70).  Id. at 467 n.191 and accompanying text.  Salacuse 
concludes that “arbitrators are very much a part of an international epistemic 
community with similar training and, in many cases, comparable background.”  
Id. at 467. 
172 DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 159, at 8 n.6 (citing Mentschikoff & 
Haggard, Decision Making and Decision Consensus in Commercial Arbitration, in LAW, 
JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 295, 307 
(June Louin Tapp & Felice J. Levine eds., 1977)). 
173 William W. Park, Arbitrator Integrity, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, supra note 38, at 189, 191 n.4.  
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Why do they nominate Queen’s Counsel, Sir Ian Brownlie,174 if 
the opposing party picks Queen’s Counsel Sir Elihu 
Lauterpacht?175  If the judge is Lalive, why does the respondent 
African state choose to hire Paulsson as counsel?  If the system is 
manned by virtuous men of this stature, what options do the 
Africans have?  What sustains the imbalance is simply put as a race 
to the top.  There is no doubt that these learned men bring prestige 
and produce high quality jurisprudence, but does it necessarily 
mean that their appointment improves the quality of the justice 
that the African states receive?  Or are the Africans perpetually 
defending themselves using everything in their arsenal?  What is 
the nature of the justice that emerges out of this process?176  The 
case studies provided in the next section will help shed some light. 
                                                     
174 Sir Ian Brownlie is one of the most recognizable names in the area of 
international law.  Before his death in Cairo at age seventy-seven, for over a 
period of twenty-five years, he appeared before the International Court of Justice 
in more than forty contentious cases.  Philippe Sands, Sir Ian Brownlie Obituary, 
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 11, 2010, 1:02 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
theguardian/2010/jan/11/sir-ian-brownlie-obituary.  He had “a formidable 
reputation for integrity and independence.”  Id.  His book, Principles of Public 
International Law, now in its eighth edition, is one of the most widely used 
treatises in the world.  It has been translated into several languages including 
Chinese, Japanese and Russian.  “Almost every international lawyer and judge 
has referred to this classic text.”  Id.  
175 Sir Lauterpacht is a prominent jurist with extensive experience as an 
advocate, adviser, arbitrator, and judge in many different forums involving such 
areas of the law as natural resources law, investment matters, expropriation, 
territorial and boundary problems, maritime delimitation, fisheries, and 
environmental issues.  High profile International Court of Justice cases in which 
he was involved include the Nottebohm case, the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 
the Barcelona Traction case, the Nuclear Tests cases, Pakistan v. India Aerial Incident 
case, El Salvador v. Honduras, Kasikili case, Qatar v. Bahrain, Malaysia/Indonesia 
(Sipadan and Ligitan) case, and the Avena case (Mexico v. US).  Arbitral tribunal 
cases include: Chile/Argentina boundary disputes, the Egypt/Israel Taba 
arbitration, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, ICSID, etc.  He was adviser on 
international law to the British Central Policy Review Staff, 1972–1974 and 1978–
1980.  He also served as an ad hoc Judge of the ICJ in the Bosnia v. Yugoslavia case 
(1993–2001), a member and President of the World Bank Administrative Tribunal, 
Chairman of the Asian Development Bank Administrative Tribunal, Chairman of 
the East African Common Market Tribunal, 1972–1975, a Presiding Commissioner 
of the UN Compensation Commission, an arbitrator in various World Bank 
(ICSID) and President of the Eritrea/Ethiopia Boundary Commission.  His 
academic achievements are also equally impressive.  For Sir Lauterpacht’s full 
biography, see Sir Elihu Lauterpacht CBE QC LLD, 20 ESSEX STREET http://www. 
20essexst.com/member/sir-elihu-lauterpacht (last visited Mar. 4, 2014). 
176 See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 159, at 9 (“The operation of the market 
in the selection of arbitrators therefore provides a key to understanding the justice 
that emerges from the decisions of arbitrators.”). 
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5.2.1. Case Study 
Consider the following three statements on the state of a 
particular aspect of the law of international investment: 
 
“There are few if any issues in international law today on which 
opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state’s power to 
expropriate the property of aliens.”177   
—Supreme Court of the United States, 1964 
 
 “[A]s a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory 
regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with 
due process and, which affects, inter alios [sic], a foreign investor or 
investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless 
specific commitments had been given by the regulating government to 
the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the 
government would refrain from such regulation.”178   
—NAFTA Tribunal, 2005 
 
“‘[T]he obligation . . . not to nationalize . . . without fair 
compensation’ . . . [constitutes] one of the generally recognized principles 
of international law.”179  [Hence, full fair market value is appropriate 
compensation.]180   
—ICSID Tribunal, 1980 
 
The arbitral process is riddled with complications flowing from 
legal uncertainty and fact-finding problems inherent in the law, 
notwithstanding the presence of competent counsel and 
arbitrators.  For African states, this problem is compounded by the 
serious cultural barriers they face in not only commanding 
audience before the virtuous men but also in communicating with 
their own counsels.  In order to contextualize these problems and 
assess the nature of justice received by the African states, three case 
                                                     
177 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). 
178 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on 
Jurisdiction and Merits, 44 I.L.M. 1345, 1456 pt. IV, ch. D, ¶ 7 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. 
Trib. 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052. 
pdf. 
179 Benvenuti & Bonfant v. Government of the People’s Republic of Congo, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/77/2, Award, ¶¶ 4.63–4.64 (Aug. 8, 1980), 1 ICSID Rep. 330 
(1993) (quoting Defense Memorial, People’s Republic of Congo, at 5). 
180 Id. ¶¶ 4.73–4.79.  This statement is my summation on this section.  
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studies are provided below.  The purpose of this discussion is to 
illustrate typical factual and legal issues that arise and their 
resolution.  Case samples were selected for demonstrative 
purposes only.  The single most important selection criterion was 
the availability of a decision on the merits in English. 
Before the selected cases are discussed, it is important to 
outline the basic framework for the constitution of arbitral 
tribunals under ICSID.  At the most rudimentary level, the legal 
framework for the constitution of an ICSID tribunal is set forth 
under Articles 37 through 40 of the ICSID Convention.181  The 
party who wants to initiate an arbitration must first submit a 
request to the Secretary General of the Centre.  If the request is not 
“manifestly” outside the jurisdiction of ICSID,182 the Secretary 
General registers the case, notifies the respondent and facilitates 
the constitution of the tribunal as soon as possible.183  The parties 
appoint either a sole or an uneven number of arbitrators.184  If a 
party or the parties fail to appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators, the 
Convention gives the Chairman of the Administrative Council,185 
who is the President of the World Bank,186 the authority to make 
the necessary appointments.187  Ordinarily, the arbitrators are 
                                                     
181 ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 37–40.  
182 See ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at art. 36 (“(1) Any Contracting State 
or any national of a Contracting State wishing to institute arbitration proceedings 
shall address a request to the effect in writing to the Secretary-General who shall 
send a copy of the request to the other party.  (2) The request shall contain 
information concerning the issues in dispute, the identity of the parties and their 
consent to arbitration in accordance with the rules of procedure for the institution 
of conciliation and arbitration proceedings. (3) The Secretary-General shall 
register the request unless he finds, on the basis of the information contained in 
the request, that the dispute is manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Centre.  
He shall forthwith notify the parties of registration or refusal to register.”). 
183 Id. at art. 37(1).  
184 Id. at art. 37(2).  For a detailed description of these provisions, see 
SCHREUER, supra note 4, at 475–89.  
185 The Administrative Council is composed of one representative of each 
Contracting State.  ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at art. 4(1). 
186 Id. at art. 5 (“The President of the Bank shall be ex officio Chairman of the 
Administrative Council . . . .”). 
187 Id. at art. 38 (“If the Tribunal shall not have been constituted within 90 
days after notice of registration of the request has been dispatched by the 
Secretary-General . . .  or such other period as the parties may agree, the Chairman 
shall, at the request of either party and after consultation with both parties as far 
as possible, appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators not yet appointed.”).  For a 
detailed description of these provisions, see SCHREUER, supra note 4, at 490–97.  He 
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appointed from the Panel of Arbitrators.188  The Panel is composed 
of arbitrators nominated by Contracting States and those 
nominated by the Chair of the Administrative Council.  The 
Convention gives Contracting States the opportunity to nominate 
up to four arbitrators and the Chair to nominate ten arbitrators.  
The Convention allows the Contracting States to nominate persons 
who are not their nationals, but requires the Chair to appoint 
persons of different nationalities.189  Although the disputing parties 
have the right to make appointments outside of the Panel, the 
Chair’s choice is limited to the Panel when she exercises her default 
appointment authority under Article 38.190 
With this background on the constitution of ICSID tribunals, 
the following case studies identify the identity of the arbitrators 
and parties and their counsel, the place of arbitration, the factual 
and legal issues addressed, the outcome of the merits and the 
allocation of cost, followed by brief commentary on the nature of 
justice that emerge out of these cases.    
Case Study No. 1: Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited (Claimant) 
v. United Republic of Tanzania (Respondent)191 
This case, in many ways, is a quintessential investment 
arbitration involving an African state.  The Arbitral Tribunal was 
composed of Mr. Gary Born, a national of the United States, 
appointed by the claimant; Mr. Toby Landau, a national of the 
United Kingdom, appointed by the respondent; and Mr. Bernard 
Hanotiau, a national of Belgium, appointed as president of the 
tribunal by the party-selected arbitrators.192  The award was 
rendered on July 24, 2008 and contains a 242 page majority opinion 
and a 10 page dissenting and concurring opinion by Mr. Gary 
Born.  The claimant, Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. (BGT), was 
                                                     
notes that “Art. 38 is the most important Article designed to safeguard the 
principle of non-frustration in the constitution of the tribunal.”  Id. at 490.  
188 ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at art. 40(1).   
189 Id. at art. 13(2).  For a discussion of these provisions, see SCHREUER, supra 
note 4, at 45–47.  
190 ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at art. 40(1–2).  For a detailed discussion 
of these provisions and bibliography, see SCHREUER, supra note 4, at 507–15.  
191 Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/22, Award (Jul. 24, 2008), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC158
9_En&caseId=C67. 
192 Id. ¶ 25–27.  
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represented by counsels from the London office of Allen & Overy 
LLP, including Judith Gill, Matthew Gearing, Hannah Ambrose, 
Michelle de Kluyver, Autumn Ellis and Andrew Pullen.193  The 
respondent state, Tanzania, was represented by a team of lawyers 
from Freshfields—consisting of Jan Paulsson, D. Brian King, 
Jonathan J. Gass, Marijn Heemskerk—along with attorneys from 
Tanzanian Attorney-General’s Chambers, including Julius Mallaba, 
and the Tanzanian law firm of Mkono & Co.194  The proceeding 
took place at both the World Bank’s office in Paris195 and 
Freshfields’ office in London.196 
In 2003, the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, and 
the African Development Bank awarded the Republic of Tanzania 
USD $140,000,000 for the purpose of repairing, upgrading, and 
extending the water supply and sewer infrastructure of its capital 
city, Dar es Salaam.197  As the tribunal put it, “[a]s a condition of 
the funding, the Republic was obliged to appoint a private 
operator to manage and operate the water and sewerage system, 
and to carry out some of the works associated with the Project.”198  
A lengthy bid process resulted in the selection of the claimant, 
Biwater, a joint venture of a UK corporation and a German 
corporation, with 80-20 shares respectively.199  Because the foreign 
company was required to involve a local Tanzanian company, it 
selected STM, and they jointly incorporated “City Water,” with 
Biwater as the majority shareholder and STM as the minority 
shareholder.200  City Water signed three contracts—collectively 
called the Project Contract—with the Dar es Salaam Water and 
Sewerage Authority (DAWASA):  the Water and Sewerage Lease 
Contract, the Supply and Installation of Plant and Equipment 
Contract and the Contract for the Procurement of Goods.201  The 
Republic—as represented by DAWASA, a parastatal corporation 
established under Tanzanian law—is listed as a party solely in the 
Lease Contract, whereas the other two contracts list City Water and 
                                                     
193 Id. ¶ 1. 
194 Id. ¶ 2.  
195 Id. ¶ 31. 
196 Id. ¶ 85.  
197 Id. ¶ 3.  
198 Id.  
199 Id. ¶ 4.  
200 Id. ¶ 5. 
201 Id. ¶ 6. 
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DAWASA as parties.202  Under the Lease Contract—the main 
subject of the dispute—City Water assumed the responsibilities 
from DAWASA to manage the water and sewerage operations, and 
also undertook the responsibility of designing and expanding the 
system while collecting revenue from customers for an initial 
period of ten years.203  A complex mix of circumstances with roots 
in the initial bidding process led to a serious failure of the 
enterprise.204  The dispute essentially pertained to the allocation of 
blame for the failure.  According to the tribunal, almost every 
aspect of the business relationship was disputed; however, one 
thing was unusually clear—that the alleged expropriation or 
actions taken by the government caused no economic damage to 
the investor because the enterprise was not profitable from the 
very beginning.205  In fact, it was allegedly an “opportunistic” bid 
that sought to renegotiate the terms after the contract had been 
awarded.206 
The tribunal found that the cumulative effect of the Tanzanian 
Government’s measures amounted to indirect expropriation, 
although no economic damage was caused.207  The factual findings 
of the tribunal include that the bid was poorly prepared; the 
project encountered problems almost as soon as it began; it 
immediately became clear that the enterprise would not work 
absent a renegotiation; renegotiations failed and the contract was 
terminated by DAWASA.208 
In the process of terminating the contract, the Republic did 
certain things that rubbed the arbitrators the wrong way.  The 
responsible minister gave a press statement about the termination 
of the contract (apparently he was running for Prime Minster), the 
Government withdrew some value added tax exemptions that they 
had promised, occupied City Water’s facilities and took over 
management, and finally arrested and deported the staff to 
Britain.209  On the basis of this, the Tribunal finally found that 
although it agrees “with the Republic’s position that the 
                                                     
202 Id. ¶¶ 7–8. 
203 Id. ¶ 9.  
204 Id. ¶¶ 14–15. 
205 Id. ¶ 767. 
206 Id. ¶ 384.   
207 Id. ¶¶ 461, 485.  
208 Id. ¶ 486.  
209 Id. ¶¶ 497-518.  
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termination of the Lease Contract at this time was inevitable, and 
was going to materialise within . . . weeks . . . these circumstances 
cannot avoid the conclusion that an expropriation of BGT’s 
contractual and property rights took place.”210  The Tribunal put 
the theoretical justification as follows:  
[W]hilst accepting that the effects of a certain severity must 
be shown to qualify an act as expropriatory, there is 
nothing to require that such effects be economic in nature.  
A distinction must be drawn between (a) interference with 
rights and (b) economic loss. A substantial interference with 
rights may well occur without actually causing any 
economic damage which can be quantified in terms of due 
compensation.211   
Hence, “the absence of economic loss or damage is primarily a 
matter of causation and quantum—rather than a necessary 
ingredient in the cause of action of expropriation itself.”212  Because 
none of the Republic’s actions caused any economic damages to 
the investor, the Tribunal’s remedy was declaratory in nature.213  
However, the finding of non-compensable fault on the part of the 
Republic allowed the Tribunal to allocate the cost of the 
proceeding equally and allow the parties cover their own 
expenses.214 
Several observations could be made here.  The Tribunal had no 
difficulty in determining material facts.  It quickly became clear 
that the project was a failed enterprise from its inception.  The 
Republic had at least two reasons to involve the investor—it was 
required by the World Bank, which provided the funding, and it 
believed that the investor would have the resources and the 
expertise to carry out the project.  When it did not work, the 
Republic took dramatic measures that an ordinary contracting 
party would not take, including detaining and deporting company 
executives.  Although this caused no ascertainable economic 
damage to the investment, the Tribunal held that it was “the straw 
                                                     
210 Id. ¶ 518.  
211 Id. ¶ 464.  
212 Id. ¶ 465.  To be sure, as the Tribunal put it, “the ‘fair market value’ of City 
Water at the date of the expropriation, 1 June 2005, was nil.” Id. ¶ 797.  
213 Id. ¶ 807.  
214 Id. ¶¶ 812–13.  
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that [broke] the camel’s back.”215  Ill-advised as they might have 
been, it is not inconceivable that a differently constituted arbitral 
tribunal might alternatively view the actions as detached sovereign 
actions, which may be remedied through diplomatic means.  The 
Tribunal did indeed sit in judgment of the acceptable levels of 
government misconduct in absolute terms.  These findings are not 
surprising at all if the identity of the government in question and 
the nationalities of the mistreated officials played a role in the 
decision making process.  More importantly, the finding of an 
actionable fault on the part of the Republic offered a legal basis for 
the allocation of cost. 
Apart from its own unwise—perhaps politically motivated— 
behavior, the African state came out of the arbitration a total loser 
in many ways.  When it took the money from the World Bank, it 
was required to hire a foreign investor.  It picked one that was not 
up to the task for various reasons.  The enterprise failed, nearly 
jeopardizing the water supply of its capital city.  It then submitted 
to international arbitration and selected a learned arbitrator who 
was apparently offended by the government’s erratic behavior.  As 
a result, it ended up paying a large amount of money for basically 
winning the case.  If signing the BITs and submitting to 
international arbitration was supposed to attract investors, it is 
difficult to see how this could help the Tanzanian Republic attract 
more investors.  In any case, although the award is supported by 
detailed analysis and highly sophisticated reasoning, the value of 
such sophistication to the respondent state is a question worth 
asking.   
Case Study No. 2: Helnan International Hotels A/S v. The Arab 
Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. 05/19)216 
The Tribunal was composed of Mr. Yves Derains, a citizen of 
France, as Chairman; Professor Rudolf Dolzer, a citizen of 
Germany, appointed by the respondent; and Mr. Michael Lee, a 
citizen of Britain, appointed by the claimant.217  The claimant is 
                                                     
215 Id. ¶ 456 (quoting Seimens v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 263 (Feb. 6, 2007)).  
216 Helnan Int’l Hotels A/S v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB 05/19, Award, (Jul. 3, 2008), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC772
_En&caseId=C64. 
217 Id. ¶ 1. 
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Helnan International Hotels, a Danish company.  It was 
represented by several attorneys from the London office of Baker 
Botts.  The respondent, the Arab Republic of Egypt (“Egypt”) was 
represented by Professor Jan Paulsson of Freshfields and several 
Egyptian counsels including Dr. Mohamed Abdel Raouf.218  The 
arbitration was conducted in Paris.219 
On September 8, 1986, Helnan entered into a management 
contract with the Egyptian Organization for Tourism (EGOTH) to 
manage the Cairo Shepheard Hotel, which EGOTH owned.220  
While the initial contract was for a period of twenty-six years, a 
subsequent amendment permitted EGOTH to sell the hotel and 
granted Helnan the option of continuing to manage or terminate 
the management contract in exchange for adequate 
compensation.221 
In 2003, the Ministry of Tourism downgraded the Shepheard 
from a five-star to a four-star hotel because of unsatisfactory 
inspection results.222  The downgrade prompted EGOTH to seek 
the termination of the management contract on grounds of 
impossibility of performance because the management contract 
required Helnan to run the hotel as a five-star.223  An arbitral 
tribunal constituted for that purpose in Cairo did exactly that—
while awarding Helnan 12.5 million Egyptian pounds for the 
settlement of debts that it owed in connection with the 
performance of the management contract.224  EGOTH paid Helnan 
the 12.5 million EGP and the Egyptian courts then enforced the 
award by evicting Helnan and allowing EGOTH to take over.225   
Based on the BIT between Egypt and Denmark signed in 1999, 
Helnan initiated this ICSID arbitration.  Helnan alleged that 
EGOTH improperly conspired with the Egyptian Ministry of 
Tourism to solicit the downgrading of the hotel so that it could sell 
the hotel unencumbered by the management contract.226  These 
measures, Helnan argued, amounted to expropriation and violated 
                                                     
218 Id. ¶ 2. 
219 Id. ¶¶ 14, 45. 
220 Id. ¶ 3. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. ¶ 5.  
223 Id. ¶ 6. 
224 Id.  
225 Id. ¶¶ 7-8.  
226 Id. ¶¶ 58-63. 
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many provisions of the BIT, including non-discrimination, as well 
as fair and equitable treatment.227  Helnan also made several 
factual allegations and adduced evidence to prove the allegations. 
Perhaps the most important question for the tribunal was 
whether the downgrade was improperly solicited so that Egypt 
could privatize the hotel unencumbered by the management 
contract.228  Helnan made at least three factual allegations that it 
said would prove a conspiracy:  (1) on June 14, 2003, the Ministry 
of Tourism conducted an inspection and issued a harsh report; (2) 
without giving Helnan enough time to cure the problems, the 
Ministry conducted another inspection on September 4, 2003, filed 
its report the same day,229 and three days later, on September 7, 
2003, the Ministry downgraded the hotel from five-star to four-
star;230 (3) just twenty-five days later, EGOTH initiated an 
arbitration proceeding in Cairo for the termination of the 
contract—suggesting prior knowledge of the downgrade.231  These 
facts collectively show the existence of a collusion to eject Helnan.  
These facts prove indirect expropriation.232 
To prove the conspiracy, Helnan called its own witness and 
presented circumstantial evidence regarding the timing of the 
inspections and the subsequent decision to downgrade.233  It also 
relied on testimony of an Egyptian witness elicited through cross-
examination.234  The Tribunal found the hastiness of the two 
inspections and the immediate decision to downgrade suspicious, 
but the Tribunal’s finding of collusion seems to critically rely on 
the testimony of EGOTH’s in-house counsel, who said that her 
department knew about the downgrade approximately sixty days 
prior to the commencement of the arbitral proceeding.235 
The in-house counsel’s testimony was so important to the 
outcome of the decision that the Tribunal reproduced it in part.  
The excerpt of the cross-examination reads: 
                                                     
227 Id. ¶¶ 50–53. 
228 Id. ¶¶ 132–137.  
229 Id. ¶ 58. 
230 Id. ¶ 134.  
231 Id. ¶ 35.  
232 Id. ¶¶ 135–36.  
233 Id. ¶¶ 64–79. 
234 Id. ¶¶ 58–64.  
235 Id. ¶ 154.   
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Q. When did you first learn of the downgrade of the 
Shepheard Hotel? 
A. Before initiating the procedures for the arbitration by a 
very, very short time.  Approximately 60 days before. 
Q. I’m sorry, you learned of the downgrade 60 days before 
initiating the arbitration? 
A. Approximately, yes.236 
During redirect, the in-house counsel, Mrs. Dorreya Refaat, 
retracted the testimony, saying that she was mistaken in her 
estimate, but the Tribunal did not believe her, noting her retraction 
“was far from . . . convincing.”237  It then held that “the Arbitral 
tribunal is satisfied that EGOTH and various Egyptian authorities, 
including the ministry of Tourism, played a significant role in the 
implementation of a plan aiming at terminating the Management 
contract.”238  Finally, however, the Tribunal held that Helnan failed 
to prove that the Egyptian state did indeed adopt these measures 
to get rid of Helnan in order to privatize the hotel.239  The only 
evidence that Helnan submitted to this effect was an affidavit by 
Mr. Bahi Nasr, the former chair of the Egyptian Hotels Company, 
the predecessor of EGOTH.240  Nasr stated that the former 
undersecretary of the Ministry of Tourism told him there was an 
order to downgrade the Shepheard hotel and terminate the 
management contract so that it could be privatized.241  However, 
when Mr. Nasr appeared before the Tribunal to offer testimony, he 
claimed he could not recall the particular conversation, but 
suspected that might have been the plan.  Unimpressed with the 
testimony, the Tribunal totally discounted the statement.242 
Some very interesting observations can be made about the 
Tribunal’s handling of the proceedings.  First, it appears that the 
Tribunal discounted all oral testimonies offered by Egyptian 
witnesses on both sides, instead relying exclusively on 
circumstantial evidence and inferences.  It is difficult to determine 
                                                     
236 Id.   
237 Id. ¶ 155. 
238 Id. ¶ 156.  
239 Id. ¶ 157. 
240 Id. ¶ 158. 
241 Id.  
242 Id.  
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if a cultural miscommunication between an all-male European 
tribunal and one female and one male Egyptian witness who 
testified under cross examination administered by experienced, 
mostly European or American counsel in Paris played any role at 
all in the decision.  But it is a fair question to ask.  Second, having 
convinced itself that a conspiracy existed using mainly 
circumstantial evidence, the Tribunal shied away from attributing 
that conspiracy to the state.  Finally, the Tribunal allocated cost 
equally, as is often done when the investor loses.243  It required 
each party to cover its own expenses and share the costs of the 
proceedings.244  Some finding of fault on the part of the state is 
often perceived to be necessary to such allocation of costs.245   
Although the Tribunal noted that it allocated costs this way 
because of the claimant’s win on jurisdiction and admissibility,246 it 
is more likely that the Tribunal’s finding of the conspiracy was the 
basis for the equal allocation of cost.  This is because winning on 
jurisdiction and inadmissibility is inconsequential if the merits are 
lost because this only allows a party to present a claim.  Ultimately, 
however, it is clear that the State is the loser in many ways because 
it had to defend a claim and pay the expenses.  It is unnecessary to 
ask the question of how an all-African tribunal might rule in this 
case because such a tribunal had already ruled on the related claim 
of termination in the Cairo arbitration.247  It is quite notable that the 
European company Helnan actually appointed an Egyptian 
arbitrator, Dr. Abdel Wahab, in the Cairo arbitration, although it 
later accused him of bias in favor of EGOTH.248  Again, the 
Tribunal’s analysis was highly sophisticated, but at the end of the 
day, the value of such sophistication and the fairness of the results 
might be questioned.  
                                                     
243 See supra Section 4.7 (discussing data related to the allocation of costs 
among parties in ICSID arbitrations). 
244 Id. ¶¶ 171–74.  
245 See supra Sections 4.6 and 4.7 (analyzing and depicting data related to 
outcomes on the merits and allocation of costs). 
246 Id. ¶ 173. 
247 Id. ¶¶ 150, 162. 
248 Id. ¶ 164.  
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Case Study No. 3: Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. 
Republic of Ghana (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24)249 
The claimant in this case is Hamester, a German company.  The 
respondent is the Republic of Ghana.  The claim was based on a 
Germany-Ghana BIT.250  The arbitrators in this case were Professor 
Brigitte Stern, a French national and President of the tribunal, Dr. 
Bernardo M. Cremades, a Spanish national appointed by the 
claimant, and Mr. Toby Landau Q.C., a British national appointed 
by the respondent.251  Both parties were represented by attorneys 
based in London, and the proceedings took place in London as 
well.252 
The facts of this case are complex.  For purposes of this 
analysis, it is sufficient to state that Hamester signed a joint 
venture agreement (JVA) with a Ghanaian public enterprise called 
Cocobod.253  The principal function of Cocobod is to buy cocoa 
beans from farmers for marketing and export, and the purpose of 
the joint venture with Hamester was to upgrade and modernize an 
old cocoa processing factory and share the profits in a mutually 
agreed proportion.254  Hamester and Cocobod (as a minority 
shareholder) incorporated a company called Wamco for this 
purpose.255  After the upgrading work was completed, they agreed 
that the entirety of the output would be sold to Hamester, but they 
did not fix the price in writing at that time.256  A few years later, 
Wamco became indebted to Cocobod for failing to pay for 
deliveries that it had taken.257  While the parties did not dispute 
that fact, Hamester denied that it was responsible for the debt, 
blaming it on failure to agree on price.258  Subsequently, the two 
sides made several attempts to agree on pricing, and eventually 
signed a price agreement.  However, Hamester later alleged that it 
                                                     
249 Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/24, Award (June 18, 2010), available at http://www.italaw. 
com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0396.pdf.  
250 Id. ¶ 1. 
251 Id. ¶ 8. 
252 Id. ¶¶ 4–5, 9.  
253 Id. ¶ 22. 
254 Id.  
255 Id. ¶¶ 23–25.  
256 Id. ¶¶ 29–33.  
257 Id. ¶ 33. 
258 Id.  
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signed this agreement under duress.259  In a related development, 
shortly after signing the price agreement, Cocobod failed to supply 
the required quantity of cocoa beans, blaming its failure on 
smuggling activities and outbreak of disease.260  Hamester 
considered Cocobod’s failure to supply the cocoa as a breach of 
their contract.261  After many efforts to renegotiate the price, 
Hamester abandoned the JVC and its managing director left 
Ghana.262 
The parties disputed all of the facts including:  whether the 
price agreement was made under duress, whether the failure to 
supply the required amount of cocoa constituted a breach of 
contract, and who owed Cocobod money, Hamester or the joint 
company Wamco.263  The parties also disputed the circumstances 
that led to the managing director’s departure; while the managing 
director alleged that he feared for his own and his family’s safety, 
Ghana suspected fraud and opened a police investigation.264  
Related to the departure of the manager, Cocobod’s General 
Manager of Operations, who was also a minority shareholder of 
Wamco, ordered the suspension of exports altogether.265  The 
sequence of the events, as well as the responsibility for each action, 
was disputed.266 
Hamester alleged that Cocobod’s actions collectively breached 
Ghana’s treaty obligations, including the principles of fair and 
equitable treatment and non-discrimination amounting to 
expropriation.267  The respondent claimed that Hamester was a 
fraudulent partner from the very beginning, and that Hamester 
failed to make a bona fide investment.268  It further alleged that 
Hamester and its managing director defrauded Wamco throughout 
the JVC.269  Alternatively, even if Wamco was responsible for any 
breach of contract, the breach was not attributable to Ghana and 
                                                     
259 Id. ¶ 33–41. 
260 Id. ¶ 42. 
261 Id. ¶ 43. 
262 Id. ¶¶ 44–67.  
263 Id. ¶¶ 205–211, 257–262, 269–276.  
264 Id. ¶¶ 55–57. 
265 Id. ¶ 53, 269. 
266 Id. ¶¶ 269–300. 
267 Id. ¶¶ 68–79.  
268 Id. ¶ 80–81.  
269 Id. ¶ 81. 
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did not rise to the level of breach of treaty obligation.270  Without 
the need to determine each disputed fact, the Tribunal, after a 
lengthy legal analysis, decided that none of the alleged acts of 
breach were attributable to Ghana.271  It held, in particular, that a 
breach of contract does not ordinarily rise to a breach of treaty 
obligation.272  However, the tribunal allocated the cost of the 
proceedings equally and required each party to cover its own 
expenses.273 
Because this case rested largely on the legal question of 
attribution, the factual inquiries were not remarkably detailed.  
Most notably, however, Ghana had to go through the process of 
defending itself against the German company for a failed business 
dealing.  If every possible form of breach of contract is framed in 
the context of breach of a treaty obligation, the number of claims 
that a state would have to defend against could be staggering.  
Significantly, in this case, the Tribunal appears to be sensitive to 
that possibility.  It is probably not unreasonable to expect more 
consistency in determining these kinds of legal questions as 
compared to findings of facts, which tend to be more culturally 
engrained because, at their core, they beg the uncomfortable 
question of who is better understood or more credible.  It is 
interesting to observe that most, if not all, of the respondent’s 
witnesses seem to be Ghanaians, while the expert witness was 
European.274  It is difficult to anticipate the possible outcome of this 
case had the facts been important.  But it is fair to assume it would 
have been much more difficult for the Ghanaians to prove their 
allegations, including bad faith ab initio and sustained fraud on the 
part of the European business partner, before an all-European 
tribunal. 
6. ICSID’S RELEVANCE FOR CHINA-AFRICA DISPUTES 
As indicated in Section 1 above, Chinese investment in Africa 
has surpassed European investment in many areas.  This trend is 
certain to continue.  The investment is large by all standards.  
                                                     
270 Id. ¶¶ 84-85.  
271 Id. ¶¶ 171–312. 
272 Id. ¶¶ 313–350.  
273 Id. ¶¶ 359–361.  
274 Id. ¶ 19 (listing the fact witnesses for Ghana as:  Mr. Kwame Sapong, Dr. 
Sammy Ohene, Mr. Flix Auaye, Mr. Isaac Osei, and Mr. Reinhold Mueller.  The 
expert witness was Mr. John Ellison.). 
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Investment disputes are inevitable.  Some large-scale disputes have 
already arisen.275  To come back to the central question that this 
article raises:  would ICSID be an attractive forum for them?  The 
reality is that ICSID still has several advantages that make it 
attractive.  With some measures of adaptability, it could serve as a 
good forum for the resolution of China-Africa or even more 
broadly Asia-Africa investment disputes.  This section attempts to 
put the above discussions into perspective and outline some of the 
measures of adaptability that need to be taken. 
6.1. Matured Legal and Institutional Framework and Maturing 
Jurisprudence 
If the problems identified in this article, which are summarized 
under subsection 5 below, are addressed, reinventing the wheel of 
procedures and enforcement of investment awards, while ignoring 
the body of emerging ‘case law,’ is probably an unnecessary step 
for Africa and its new economic partners.  As dubious as its 
genesis might have been, the enforcement of an arbitral award, as 
if it were the domestic court judgment of the state where it needs to 
be enforced, is an innovative legal notion that most African states 
and some Asian states, including China, have subscribed to for 
various historical and practical reasons.276  This method of 
enforcement is worth preserving, assuming that the decisions are 
rendered fairly and equitably in a manner that addresses the 
deficiencies identified above and summarized below.  It is also 
unnecessary to ignore the maturing jurisprudence of international 
investment law of the last half-century, much of which could be 
attributed to ICSID tribunals. 
6.2. Neutrality 
One of the obvious advantages of ICSID, with its traditional 
Western-centric attributes, is that it still enjoys the advantage of 
                                                     
275 See, e.g., Alyx Barker, Gabon Faces ICC Claim from Chinese Oil Producer, 
GLOBAL ARB. REV., (March 19, 2013) http://www.globalarbitrationreview. 
com/news/article/31421/ (reporting a claim for $300 million dollars by a 
subsidiary of a Chinese oil and gas group against Gabon and the counterclaim for 
double that amount). 
276 See ICSID Convention, supra note 4, at art. 54(1) (“Each Contracting State 
shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and 
enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if 
it were a final judgment of a court in that State.”). 
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neutrality in the Africa versus non-European-investor disputes.  
Although the democracy deficit discussed above would still be an 
issue, ironically, it does not carry the unfair imbalance that often 
accompanies the resolution of disputes between a European 
investor and an African state. 
The most serious problem remains the cultural competence of 
the members of the tribunal and counsel on both sides, and the 
attendant cultural barriers faced by African and Asian parties.  As 
previously stated, the determination of complex facts is a deeply 
cultural phenomenon that requires familiarity with the culture.  
This could be addressed through a selection process that takes 
cultural competence into account—regardless of the arbitrators’ 
home state. 
6.3. Expertise 
The law of international investment can be extremely complex, 
as are the legal relationships that precipitate investment disputes.  
Frequently, the scale of the economic relationship is also 
enormous.  The identification, interpretation, and proper 
application of the law to the complex investment related factual 
circumstances and the rendering of a just and acceptable award 
almost always requires not only technical competence, exposure, 
and experience, but also appropriate temperament and reputation.  
Persons who serve on ICSID tribunals are often selected for these 
qualities.  Any system of investment arbitration cannot ignore such 
expertise and reputation accumulated over a long period of time.  
Since such expertise is largely non-African and non-Asian, a new 
way of harnessing it must be considered, for example, consciously 
diversifying each tribunal.  An ideal tribunal would have members 
from Africa and Asia, as well as Europe or other Western 
countries. 
6.4. Convenience 
The European fora are geographically and otherwise most 
convenient for disputes involving African states and Asian 
investors.  It must be acknowledged that such convenience is not 
limited to the availability of matured institutions and facilities.  For 
a variety of historical reasons, Africans and Asians are both more 
familiar with Europe than with each other.  At the most basic level, 
they often communicate using European languages.  As such, the 
convenience cannot be overstated.  However, as indicated below, 
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serious cultural barriers must be addressed for the convenience to 
bear fruit. 
6.5. Adaptability 
Although ICSID has all of these advantages, to stay relevant for 
Africa and its new economic partners, it must make a conscious 
effort to address some of the problems identified in this article.  
First and foremost, it must address the serious democracy deficit 
that all indicators prove.  In this day and age, any suggestion that 
there are no qualified women and qualified African or Asian 
arbitrators cannot be true.  Traditional notions of justice demand 
some level of proximity between the judge and the judged.  In 
modern times, elementary notions of legitimacy require some 
diversity in the arbitrator pool.  Despite some efforts, the result so 
far has been disappointing.  No matter how it is framed, what 
sustains such aristocratic justice is a level of monopoly enabled by 
ICSID and its World Bank roots and affiliation.  At a time when the 
World Bank is no longer the only or even the most important 
source of financing for investment projects in Africa and 
elsewhere,277 the virtues of the existing system of justice will 
become even more questionable.  ICSID must take affirmative 
steps to address the democracy deficit. 
It may be argued that there is nothing that ICSID can do 
because the parties themselves nominate the virtuous men to act as 
arbitrators.  For the sake of its own legitimacy, ICSID can lead by 
example when it has the occasion to exercise its appointment 
authority under Article 38.  It could also take steps to demystify the 
process through a conscious outreach effort outside of the 
Washington, D.C.-London-Paris corridor.  This may be 
accompanied by efforts encouraging hearings to take place outside 
of the traditional venues, preferably near or at the place where 
most of the evidence is found.  Relocating the hearing venue would 
in turn encourage the involvement of traditionally under-
represented groups to be involved as arbitrators, counsel, and 
expert witnesses. 
Second, although much of the traditional literature addresses 
the incoherence of the jurisprudence and debates the need for 
appellate discipline, an important area that is often overlooked is 
                                                     
       277  See supra Part 2 (discussing China’s overtaking of the World Bank as the 
largest source of financing in Africa). 
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the allocation of cost.  The allocation of cost appears to be a much 
bigger problem than realized because it offers at least two wrong 
incentives:  (1) it fails to punish a party that brings forth non-
meritorious or marginally meritorious claims; and (2) it sustains 
the arbitral process because the cost of proceedings is shared by 
both parties even when no fault is found on the part of the 
respondent state.  Indeed, the allocation of cost almost always 
operates to the disadvantage of the respondent state because the 
private investor is almost always the party who initiates the 
process.  If the investor is not afraid of being penalized for bringing 
a non-meritorious claim through the allocation of cost, it would 
have fewer disincentives to try its chances.  The state’s costs are 
likely to be higher in most instances because the respondent states 
arbitrate cases in the investor’s home state or at least continent and 
therefore the state has to hire attorneys there in addition to paying 
for transportation and accommodation of in-house counsel, 
government officials, and covering expenses for fact and expert 
witnesses as well as translation and interpretation services.  
Although the private investor is also likely to bear similar costs, in 
many cases, the opportunity cost might be lower.  In any case, 
unless somehow policed properly, the equal allocation of cost as a 
default rule is likely to result in abuse of the system.278  As Figure 7 
shows, in all cases where the host state won, it was required to 
cover its own expenses and share the cost of the tribunal equally.  
The wisdom of this approach is questionable. 
The third issue that ICSID must address, which is also related 
to the cost issue, is the liberal finding of jurisdiction.  Apart from 
the difficulty in the definition and use of summary judgment 
standards, jurisdictional decisions also appear to suffer from 
wrongful incentives.  Appointment as an arbitrator in ICSID 
proceedings is not only a prestigious honor, but also financially 
rewarding, although perhaps less so than high-stake commercial 
                                                     
278 See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Rationalizing Costs in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 769, 778 (2011) (“As international arbitration has 
no equivalent to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requiring good-faith 
pleadings, the relationship has implications for using cost shifting in arbitration— 
perhaps even in domestic litigation—to create incentives that promote efficient 
and fair dispute resolution.”).  Summarizing her empirical study of costs in 
investment arbitration cases, Professor Franck puts the problem mildly as “the 
larger picture suggests that costs exhibited a degree of uncertainty.”  Id. at 778. 
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arbitrations.279  Persons who serve in this capacity are, in most 
cases, of high moral and ethical character and are unlikely to be 
influenced by the financial gains and added prestige that 
accompany the appointment.  However, there is a built-in 
incentive for various stakeholders for the cases to continue beyond 
the jurisdictional phase; such stakeholders include highly 
compensated outside counsel representing respondent states and 
in-house counsel and officials who get various travel and related 
benefits when the case continues.  Unfortunately, the jurisdictional 
decisions are sometimes tied to the allocation of cost.  In at least 
one of the cases profiled above, the tribunal allocated cost equally 
because the investor prevailed on the jurisdictional issue only.280  
Such being the reality of investment arbitration, ICSID must be 
sensitive to jurisdictional decisions by tribunals operating under its 
auspices.  Although it does not have a direct supervisory role, it 
could monitor the decisions, make them available to the extent 
parties allow, attract and encourage commentary and academic 
writing, and make statistics on jurisdictional decisions by specific 
tribunals and arbitrators available in an intelligible manner. 
Fourth and related to the above, ICISD must define and enforce 
serious ethical and conflict standards.  Although structurally it 
does not have regulatory and supervisory jurisdiction on at least 
party appointed arbitrators, it could use its good offices to 
disseminate specific data on trends and track-records, invite and 
encourage commentary on such issue, set-up and systematize 
conflicts check processes, and make such data available for future 
litigants.  So much has been said about the need for ethical rules in 
international arbitration,281 but it is perhaps more acutely 
                                                     
279 Under Regulation 14(1) of the most recent ICSID Administrative and 
Financial Regulation, the current daily payment for meetings, hearings, and work 
related to the case is $3000.  Arbitrators are also eligible for additional per diems, 
accommodation, travel, and other allowances.  ICSID, Administrative and Financial 
Regulations, Regulation 14(1): Direct Costs of Individual Proceedings, at 60, ICSID Doc. 
ICSID/15/Rev.1 (Jan. 2003), compiled in ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND 
RULES, available at   https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/part 
C-chap03.htm.   
280 See Franck, supra note 278, at 778 (“Tribunals were most likely to 
rationalize their decisions using the parties’ relative success and equitable 
considerations.”). 
281 See, e.g., Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a 
Code of Conduct for International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 341 (2002) 
(discussing a methodology for prescribing normative code of ethics for 
international arbitration).  
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important in investment arbitration involving economically 
weaker states. 
Finally and most importantly, ICSID must attempt to create a 
generally welcoming and navigable environment for those who 
have traditionally, implicitly considered it an imposition as a 
condition of receiving foreign investment or even a condition of 
doing business or receiving loans. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The statistical studies and the closer review of ICSID cases 
involving African states do not necessarily reveal systematic and 
glaring bias against or purposeful disadvantage to the positions of 
African states.  In fact, the outcome seems to be surprisingly 
balanced and the jurisprudence profound.  However, measuring 
outcome neither explains nor justifies ICSID’s diversity deficit and 
related shortcomings.  As this article demonstrated, a deeper 
inquiry paints an unflattering picture on the reasons for the 
African states’ acceptance from the very beginning and their 
experience in the last half-century:  a history of benevolent 
imposition and effective exclusion from meaningful decision 
making.  As the economic leverage increasingly shows diversity 
and leans Eastwards, to stay relevant and useful, ICSID must take 
a closer look at its half-century of arbitral justice and attempt to 
remedy the perceived inequities.  This article has attempted to 
identify and characterize some of the glaring problems and offered 
thoughts on how they might be addressed.  
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APPENDIX I 
Country Location Parties Attorneys Arbitrators Jurisdiction 
(Yes / No) 
Algeria Paris L.E.S.I. 
S.p.A. & 
Astaldi 
S.p.A. v. 
People’s 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Algeria, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/05/3 
 
Investor 
nationality: 
Italian  
Professor 
Antonio 
Crivellaro, 
Professor Luca 
Radicati di 
Brozolo, and  
Andrea 
Carlevaris 
(Bonelli Erede 
Pappalardo, 
Milan) for 
Claimant 
 
S.E.M. 
Abdelmalek 
Sellal, Minister 
of Water 
Resources 
Algeria; 
Dominique 
Falque (Falque & 
Assoc., Paris, 
France); 
Mohammed 
Chemloul & 
Professor 
Ahmed Laraba 
(Algeria) for 
Respondent 
President: 
Pierre Tercier 
(Swiss)  
Arbitrators: 
Emmanuel 
Gaillard 
(French), 
Bernard 
Hanotiau 
(Belgian)* 
 
* Bernard 
Hanotiau 
(Belgian) 
appointed 
following the 
passing away 
of André   J.E. 
Faurès 
(Belgian) 
  
Yes 
  Consortium  
Groupemen
t L.E.S.I. – 
DIPENTA 
v. People’s 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Algeria, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/03/8 
 
Investor 
nationality: 
Italian 
 Professor 
Antonio 
Crivellaro 
(Bonelli Erede 
Pappalordo, 
Milan) for  
Claimant 
 
S.E.M. 
Abdelmadjid 
Attar, Minister 
of Water 
Resources 
Algeria; 
Dominique 
Falque (Falque & 
Assoc., Paris, 
France); 
Mohammed 
Chemloul & 
Professor 
President: 
Pierre Tercier 
(Swiss)  
Arbitrators: 
Emmanuel  
Gaillard 
(French),  
André  J.E. 
Faurès 
(Belgian) 
No.  
Consortium 
had no 
standing, 
new request 
for 
arbitration  
would need 
to be 
brought by 
Italian 
companies 
on their 
own behalf. 
See 
ARB/05/3. 
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Ahmend Laraba 
(Algeria) for 
Respondent 
Burkina 
Faso 
 Société 
d’Investigat
ion de 
Recherche 
et 
d’Exploitati
on Minière 
v. Burkina 
Faso, ICSID 
Case No.  
ARB/97/1   
 
Investor 
nationality: 
French 
(incorporat
ed under 
French law) 
  President: 
Arghyrios A. 
Fatouros 
(Greek) 
Arbitrators: 
Séna 
Agbayissah 
(Togolese), 
Pierre Tercier 
(Swiss)  
 
Burundi Paris Goetz v. 
Republic of 
Burundi, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/95/3   
 
Investor 
nationality: 
Belgian 
Dominique 
Herbosch, 
(Herbosch & 
Herbosch, 
Belgium) for 
Claimant  
 
Marie Ancilla 
Ntakaburimvo, 
Ministry of 
Justice, Burundi 
for Respondent 
President: 
Prosper Weil 
(French) 
Arbitrators: 
Mohammed 
Bedjaoui 
(Algerian), 
Jean-Denis 
Bredin (French)  
  
Yes: on 
issues of 
legality of 
withdrawal 
of free zone 
certification 
 
No: on 
issues of 
reimbursem
ent of taxes 
and 
customs 
duties 
  Goetz v. 
Republic of 
Burundi, 
ICSID Case 
No.  
ARB/01/2  
 
Investor 
nationality: 
Belgian 
Dominique 
Herbosch, 
(Herbosch & 
Herbosch, 
Belguim); 
Professor 
Bernard 
Hanotiau & 
Erica Stein 
(Hanotiau & van 
den Berg, 
Brussels, 
Belgium) for 
Claimant  
 
S.E. Madame 
Marie Ancilla 
Ntakaburimvo, 
Minister of 
President: 
Gilbert 
Guillaume 
(French)* 
Arbitrators: 
Jean-Denis 
Bredin 
(French),  
Ahmed Sadek 
El Kosheri 
(Egyptian)    
 
* Gilbert 
Guillaume 
(French) 
appointed 
following the 
resignation of 
Prosper Weil 
Yes 
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Justice and 
Attorney 
General; Protais 
Nkezimana, 
Counsel for the 
State; Sixte 
Sizimwe 
Kazirukanyo, 
Bar of Burundi; 
Nicolas Angelet 
(Liedekerke, 
Wolters, 
Waelbroek, 
Kirkpatrick, 
Brussels, 
Belgium) for  
Respondent. 
(French)  
Camero
on 
 Lafarge v. 
Republic of 
Cameroon, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/02/4   
   
 Washingto
n, D.C. 
Klöckner 
Industrie-
Anlagen 
GmbH v.  
United 
Republic of 
Cameroon 
& Société 
Camerouna
ise des 
Engrais, 
ICSID Case 
No.  
ARB/81/2  
 
Investor 
nationality: 
German 
Philippe Nouel, 
Esq. for 
Claimant  
 
Ministry of 
Industrial and 
Commercial 
Development, 
Ministry of 
Finance, and Jan 
Paulsson Esq. 
(Coudert Freres, 
Paris) for  
Respondent  
(a) Original 
Tribunal (1981) 
President: 
Eduardo 
Jimenez De 
Arechaga  
(Uruguayan) 
Arbitrators: 
William D. 
Rogers (U.S.), 
Dominique 
Schmidt 
(French)  
 
(b) First 
Annulment 
Proceeding Ad 
hoc Committee   
(1984)  
President:  
Pierre Lalive 
(Swiss) 
Members:  
Ahmed Sadek 
El-Kosheri 
(Egyptian), 
Ignaz Seidl-
Hohenveldern 
(Austrian)    
 
(c) 
Yes 
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Resubmission 
Proceeding 
Tribunal  (1985) 
President:  Carl 
F. Salans (U.S.) 
Arbitrators:  
Jorge 
Castaneda 
(Mexican),    
Juan Antonio 
Cremades 
Sanz-Pastor 
(Spanish)      
 
(d) Second 
Annulment 
Proceeding Ad 
hoc Committee 
(1988)  
President:  
Sompong 
Sucharitkul 
(Thai) 
Members:  
Andrea 
Giardina 
(Italian), Kéba 
Mbaye 
(Senegalese)  
Central 
African 
Republi
c 
Paris Shareholder
s of SESAM  
v. Central 
African 
Republic, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
CONC/07/
1 
 President: 
Emmanuel 
Gaillard 
(French)   
Conciliators: 
Pierre Mayer 
(French),   
Antoine Grothe 
(Central 
African)   
 
 Paris M. 
Meerapfel 
Söhne AG 
v. Central 
African 
Republic, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/07/10   
Cabinet Caluwé 
& Horsmans, 
Brussels, 
Belgium for 
Claimants  
 
Cabinet Bizon 
Ingénierie 
Juridique, 
Bangui, Central 
African 
Republic; 
Jacques Vergès 
and Corinne 
Blanc, Paris, 
President: 
Azzedine 
Kettani 
(Moroccan)  
Arbitrators: 
François T’Kint 
(Belgian),  
Marie-
Madeleine 
Mborantsuo 
(Gabonese)   
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France for 
Respondent 
Democr
atic 
Republi
c of the 
Congo 
Zurich Internation
al Quantum 
Resources 
Ltd., 
Frontier 
SPRL & 
Compagnie 
Minière de 
Sakania 
SPRL v. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/10/21 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
IQ 
Registered 
in British 
Virgin 
Islands; 
Frontier: 
Congolese; 
COMISA: 
Congolese 
M. Geoffrey 
Cowper (Fasken 
Martineau 
DuMoulin, 
Vancouver, 
Canada); 
Dominique 
Gibbons, René 
Cadieux, & 
Philippe 
Charest-Beaudry 
(Fasken 
Martineau 
DuMoulin, 
Montreal, 
Canada); Yves 
Baratte (Simons 
& Simons LLP, 
Paris, France) for 
Claimant 
 
José Maria Perez 
& Louis 
Christophe 
Delanoy (Bredin 
Prat, Paris, 
France) for 
Respondent 
President: 
Pierre Tercier 
(Swiss)   
Arbitrators: 
Horacio A. 
Grigera Naón 
(Argentine),   
Brigitte Stern 
(French)   
 
 Paris African 
Holding 
Co. of Am., 
Inc. & 
Société 
Africaine 
de 
Constructio
n au Congo 
S.A.R.L. v. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/05/21  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
 
African 
Holding 
Company: 
United 
David Rivkin 
Barton Legum         
Yulia Andreeva 
Anne-Sophie 
Dufêtre 
(Debevoise & 
Plimpton LLP) 
David A. 
Saltman (Law 
Offices of David 
A. Saltman, New 
Jersey, USA) for 
Claimant 
 
S.E. le Bâtonnier 
Honorius Minay 
Booka, Ministre 
de la Justice et 
Garde des 
Sceaux, Palais de 
Justice 
Tshibangu 
Kalala, Cabinet 
Kikangala & 
President: 
Francisco 
Orrego Vicuña 
(Chilean)* 
Arbitrators: 
Otto L.O. de 
Witt Wijnen 
(Dutch),  
Dominique 
Grisay 
(Belgian)**    
 
* Francisco 
Orrego Vicuña 
(Chilean) 
appointed 
following the 
resignation of 
Ahmed Sadek 
El-Kosheri 
(Egyptian) 
  
** Dominique 
Grisay 
No 
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States 
 
SAFRICAS: 
Congolese 
Associés for 
Respondent 
(Belgian) 
appointed 
following the 
resignation of 
Teresa 
Giovannini 
(Swiss)   
  Russell Res. 
Int’l Ltd. v. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/04/11 
 President: 
Horacio A. 
Grigera Naon 
(Argentine)   
Arbitrators: 
Franklin 
Berman 
(British),   
Yawovi 
Agboyibo 
(Togolese)  
  
 
 Paris Miminco 
LLC v. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/03/14 
 President: 
Ahmed Sadek 
El-Kosheri 
(Egyptian)   
Arbitrators: 
Marc Lalonde 
(Canadian),   
Catherine 
Kessedjian 
(French)   
 
 
  Ridgepoint
e Overseas 
Devs., Ltd. 
v. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/00/8 
 President: Raúl 
E. Vinuesa 
(Argentine)  
Arbitrators: 
Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld 
(U.S.),  Brigitte 
Stern (French)   
 
  Mitchell v. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/99/7 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
American 
In Annulment 
Proceeding:  
Philip Botha 
(Philip J. Botha 
Attorneys 
Johannesburg, 
South Africa); 
Emmanuel 
Gaillard 
(Shearman & 
Sterling LLP 
Paris, France) for 
Claimant 
 
Tshibangu 
(a) Original 
Arbitration 
Proceeding     
President: 
Andreas 
Bucher (Swiss)   
Arbitrators: 
Yawovi 
Agboyibo 
(Togolese),   
Marc Lalonde 
(Canadian),* 
* Marc Lalonde 
(Canadian) 
appointed 
Yes 
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Kalala 
(Brussels, 
Belgium); 
Nicolas Angelet 
and 
Joe Sepulchre 
(Liedekerke, 
Wolters, 
Waelbroeck, 
Kirkpatrick, 
Brussels, 
Belgium) for 
Respondent 
following the 
passing away 
of Willard Z. 
Estey 
(Canadian)  
 
(b) Annulment 
Proceeding     
Ad hoc 
Committee   
President: 
Antonias C. 
Dimolitsa 
(Greek)   
Members: 
Robert S.M. 
Dossou 
(Beninese),   
Andrea 
Giardina 
(Italian)   
  
  Banro Am. 
Res., Inc. & 
Société 
Aurifère du 
Kivu et du 
Maniema 
S.A.R.L. v. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
ICSID Case 
No. ARB 
/98/7 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
A bit 
muddy.  
Banro 
American 
Resources: 
American 
but Banro 
Resource: 
Canadian; 
SAKIMA: 
Congolese 
subsidiary 
 President:  
Prosper Weil 
(French)   
Arbitrators:  
Alioune Diagne 
(Senegalese),    
Carveth 
Harcourt Geach 
(South African) 
No 
 Washingto
n, D.C. 
Suppleme
ntal 
Am. Mfg. & 
Trading, 
Inc. v. 
Democratic 
 (a) Original 
Arbitration 
Proceeding 
President:  
Yes 
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hearing in 
Paris 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/93/1 
 
Investor 
nationality: 
American 
Sompong 
SucharitkuL 
(Thai) 
Arbitrators:  
Heribert 
Golsong 
(German), 
Kéba Mbaye 
(Senegalese) 
   
(b) Revision 
Proceeding    
President:  
Sompong 
SucharitkuL 
(Thai) 
Arbitrators:  
Daoud L. 
Khairallah 
(Lebanese),* 
Kéba Mbaye 
(Senegalese) 
 
* Daoud L. 
Khairallah 
(Lebanese) 
appointed 
following the 
death of 
Heribert 
Golsong 
(German) 
Republi
c of the 
Congo 
GenevaPa
ris 
Benvenuti 
& Bonfant 
v. People’s 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/77/2 
 
Investor 
nationality: 
Head office 
Rome; 
Italian 
 President: 
Jørgen Trolle 
(Danish)* 
Arbitrators: 
Rudolf 
Bystricky 
(Czechoslovak), 
Edilbert 
Razafindralam
bo (Malagasy) 
 
* Jørgen Trolle 
(Danish) 
appointed 
following the 
resignation of 
Alex Bonn 
(Luxembourg) 
Yes 
 Paris AGIP SpA 
v. People’s 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
Piero Bernadini 
and Professor 
Andrea Giardina 
for Claimant  
President: 
Jørgen Trolle 
(Danish) 
Arbitrators: 
Yes 
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ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/77/1 
 
AGIP S.p.A 
Italian; 
subsidiary 
AGIP 
(Congolese) 
SA 
(Congolese)
; AGIP 
owned 90% 
of 
Hydrocarbo
ns (Swiss) 
 
Minister of 
Justice and 
Labor, Minister 
of Energy and 
Mines, Legal 
Advisor to 
Ministry of 
Industry and 
Tourism and 
Roger Martin for 
Respondent 
René-Jean 
Dupuy 
(French), Fuad 
Rouhani 
(Iranian) 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
 Compagnie 
Française 
pour le 
Développe
ment des 
Fibres 
Textiles v. 
Côte 
d’Ivoire, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/97/8 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
no award: 
CFDT 
appears to 
be French 
 President: 
Pierre Drai 
(French)   
Arbitrators: 
Matthieu De 
Boisséson 
(French),   
Marcel Storme 
(Belgian)  
 
  Adriano 
Gardella 
SpA v. Côte 
d’Ivoire, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/74/1 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Italian 
 President: 
Pierre Cavin 
(Swiss)*  
Arbitrators: 
Jacques Michel 
Grossen 
(Swiss),** 
Dominique 
Poncet (Swiss), 
 
* Pierre Cavin 
(Swiss) 
appointed 
following the 
passing away 
of André 
Panchaud 
(Swiss), 
 
Yes 
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** Jacques 
Michel Grossen 
(Swiss) 
appointed 
following the 
passing away 
of Edonard 
Zellweger 
(Swiss)  
Egypt Paris Malicorp 
Ltd. v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/08/18 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Incorporate
d in UK 
Christian 
Bremond, Sylvie 
Morel, Yassin 
Tagelding 
Yassin, Jean-
Pierre Coutard 
(Brémond, 
Vaïsse, Rambert 
& Associés, 
Paris, France)  
for Claimant  
 
Thomas H. 
Webster, Asser 
HARB (Paris – 
France) & H.E. 
Sedky Kholousy, 
Mr. Ahmed Saad 
(The Egyptian 
State Lawsuits 
Authority, Cairo, 
Egypt) for 
Respondent  
 
(b) Annulment 
Brémond, 
Vaïsse, Rambert 
& Associés, 
Paris, France for 
Claimant  
 
Dr. Prof. Ahmed 
El-Kosheri (The 
Egyptian State 
Lawsuits 
Authority, Cairo, 
Egypt) for 
Respondent 
(a) Original 
Arbitration 
Proceeding 
Tribunal 
constituted:  
June 02, 2009 
President:  
Pierre Tercier 
(Swiss), 
Arbitrators:  
Luiz Olavo 
Baptista 
(Brazilian), 
Pierre-Yves 
Tschanz 
(Swiss/Irish)  
 
(b) Annulment 
Proceeding Ad 
hoc Committee 
constituted:  
July 08, 2011 
President:  
Andrés Rigo 
Sureda 
(Spanish) 
Members:  
Stanimir A. 
Alexandro V 
(Bulgarian), 
Eduardo Silva 
Romero 
(Colombian/Fr
ench)  
Yes 
 Paris Helnan 
Internation
al Hotels 
A/S v. 
Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt, 
Michael P. 
Lennon Jr., Ania 
Farren, and 
Devashish 
Krishan (Baker 
Botts London, 
UK) & Peter 
(a) Original 
Arbitration 
Proceeding 
President: Yves 
Derains 
(French) 
Arbitrators: 
Yes 
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ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/05/19 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Incorporate
d in 
Denmark 
Griffin, 
(Conyngham 
Advisors, 
London UK) for 
Claimant  
 
Counselor Milad 
Sidhom, 
President States 
Lawsuits 
Authority, Dr. 
Ahmed El 
Kosheri, 
(Kosheri, Rashed 
& Riad Cairo, 
Egypt); Jan 
Paulsson, 
(Freshfields 
Paris France), 
Dr. Karim Hafez, 
(Hafez Law 
Firm, Cairo, 
Egypt) & Dr. 
Mohamed Abdel 
Raouf (Abdel 
Raouf Law Firm, 
Cairo, Egypt) for 
Respondents 
Michael J.A. 
Lee (British), 
Rudolf Dolzer 
(German)  
 
(b) Annulment 
Proceeding Ad 
hoc Committee 
President: 
Stephen M. 
Schwebel (U.S.) 
Members: Bola 
Ajibola 
(Nigerian), 
Campbell 
McLachlan 
(New Zealand)  
 Paris Waguih 
Elie George 
Siag & 
Clorinda 
Vecchi v. 
Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/05/15 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Italian 
(investor 
dual 
Egyptian 
citizenship 
point of 
controversy 
in 
Jurisdiction 
decision) 
 Reginald R. 
Smith, Craig S 
Miles,  Kenneth 
R. Fleuriet (King 
& Spalding LLP) 
for Claimant  
 
Dr. Ahmed 
Kamal 
Aboulmagd, 
Hazim A. 
Rizkana Helmy, 
(Hamza & 
Partners Baker & 
McKenzie 
International –
Cairo), Lawrence 
W. Newman 
(Baker & 
McKenzie LLP –
New York), H. E. 
Counsellor 
Milad Sidhom 
Boutros,  
Hussein M. F. 
Mostafa,  Asser 
(a) Original 
Arbitration 
Proceeding 
President:  
David A.R. 
Williams (New 
Zealand) 
Arbitrators:  
Francisco 
Orrego Vicuña 
(Chilean), 
Michael C. 
Pryles 
(Australian)  
 
(b) Annulment 
ProceedingAd 
hoc Committee   
President:  
Stephen M. 
Schwebel (U.S.) 
Members:  
Azzedine 
Kettani 
(Moroccan), 
Peter Tomka 
Yes Vicuña 
partial 
dissent on 
juris. 
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M A Harb (State 
Law Suites 
Authority, 
Egypt) for 
Respondent  
(Slovak)  
 Paris Jan de Nul 
N.V. & 
Dredging 
Int’l N.V. v. 
Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/04/13  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Belgian 
Prof. Antonio 
Crivellaro and 
Prof. Luca 
Radicati di 
Brozolo Bonelli 
Erede 
Pappalardo 
(Milan, Italy) for 
Claimant  
 
Dr. Iskandar 
Ghattas Under 
Secretary, 
Ministry of 
Justice; Dr. 
Mostafa Abdel 
Ghaffar, Director 
of International 
Cooperation, 
Ministry of 
Justice; Hosam 
Abdel Azim, 
President of the 
Office of State 
Litigation; 
Osama 
Mahmoud, 
Office of State 
Litigation and 
Robert Saint-
Esteban and 
Louis-
Christophe 
Delanoy, Bredin 
Prat (Paris 
France) for 
Respondent 
President: 
Gabrielle 
Kaufmann-
Kohler (Swiss)  
Arbitrators: 
Pierre Mayer 
(French), 
Brigitte Stern  
(French) 
Yes 
 The 
Hague 
Joy Mining 
Machinery 
Ltd. v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/03/11 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Incorporate
Hugh R. 
McCombs, James 
E. Tancula, 
Michael D. 
Regan,Timothy 
Tyler, James 
Fielden, James 
A. Chokey, Kim 
R. Kodousek for 
Claimant  
 
Dr. Ahmed 
(a) Original 
Arbitration 
President: 
Francisco 
Orrego Vicuña 
(Chilean)  
Arbitrators: 
Christopher G. 
Weeramantry  
(Sri Lankan),   
William 
Laurence Craig  
No 
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d under the 
laws of 
England 
and Wales,  
Sadek El-
Kosheri, Dr. 
Andres Reiner, 
Counselor 
Hossam Abd-El 
Azim, Counselor 
Osama Aboul-
Kheir, Mahmoud 
Soysal for 
Respondent 
(U.S.)   
 
(b) Annulment 
Proceeding Ad 
hoc Committee   
President: 
Antonias C. 
Dimolitsa 
(Greek)  
Members: 
Michael Hwang 
(Singaporean),  
José Luis Shaw 
(Uruguayan)   
 Paris – 1st 
sess. 
Cairo – 
hearing of 
witnesses 
Geneva – 
hearing of 
witnesses 
Geneva – 
oral 
argument 
Ahmonseto, 
Inc. & 
Others v. 
Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/02/15 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
United 
States 
 (a) Original 
Arbitration 
Proceeding  
President: 
Pierre Tercier 
(Swiss)   
Arbitrators: 
Ibrahim 
Fadlallah 
(Lebanese/Fren
ch),   
Alain Viandier 
(French)   
 
(b) Annulment 
Proceeding 
Ad hoc 
Committee    
President: Piero 
Bernardini 
(Italian)   
Members: 
Azzedine 
Kettani 
(Moroccan),   
Peter Tomka 
(Slovak)   
 
Yes 
 Paris Champion 
Trading Co. 
& 
Ameritrade 
Int’l, Inc. v. 
Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt , 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/02/9 
 
Mr. Emmanual 
Gaillard, Mr. 
John Savage, 
Shearman & 
Sterling (Paris, 
France; 
Singapore) for 
Claimant 
 
Robert Saint-
Esteben, Tim 
Portwood,  
President: 
Robert Briner 
(Swiss) 
Arbitrators: L. 
Yves Fortier 
(Canadian), 
Laurent Aynès 
(French) 
Yes 
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Investor 
Nationality: 
Champion: 
United 
States; 
Ameritrade 
Internation
al: United 
States; 
James T. 
Wahba, 
John B. 
Wahba and 
Timothy T. 
Wahba 
(dual 
citizens 
United 
States and 
Egypt) 
Matthieu 
Pouchepadass, 
Bredin Prat 
 (Paris, France) 
for Respondent 
 Initially 
Washingto
n D.C. 
(subseque
nt 
hearings 
could take 
place in 
Paris, 
Hague or 
Washingto
n D.C. or 
any other 
place 
upon 
agreement 
of parties) 
Middle East 
Cement 
Shipping & 
Handling 
Co. S.A. v. 
Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/99/6 
Nicolaos 
Georgilis, 
Sarwat A. 
Shahid, 
Ashraf Yehia for 
Claimant 
 
Counselor 
Ibrahim M. 
Refaat, President 
Counselor 
Hussein M. 
Fathi, Vice-
President 
Counselor 
Osama A. 
Mahmoud, Vice-
President 
Egyptian State 
Lawsuits 
Authority 
Dr. Aktham El 
Kholy, Counsel 
for Respondent 
President: 
Karl-Heinz 
Böckstiegel 
(German)  
Arbitrators: 
Piero 
Bernardini 
(Italian),  
Don Wallace, 
Jr. (U.S.)  
Yes 
 Paris Wena 
Hotels Ltd. 
v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/98/4  
 
Investor 
Emmanuel 
Gaillard, John 
Savage & Peter 
Griffin (of 
Shearman & 
Sterling) for 
Claimant 
 
Counselor 
Osama Ahmed 
(a) Original 
Tribunal 
1998/1999 
President: 
Monroe Leigh 
(U.S.) 
Arbitrators: 
Ibrahim 
Fadlallah 
(Lebanese/Fren
Yes 
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Nationality: 
Incorporate
d in the 
United 
Kingdom 
Mahmoud and 
Counselor 
Hussein Mostafa 
Fathi from 
Egyptian State 
Lawsuits 
Authority; Eric 
Schwartz and 
Simon B. 
Stebbings of 
Freshfields 
Bruckhaus 
Deringer for 
Respondent 
ch), Don 
Wallace, Jr. 
(U.S.) *,**  
 
* Don Wallace, 
Jr. (U.S.) 
appointed 
following the 
resignation of 
Michael F. 
Hoellering 
(U.S.) 
 
** Michael F. 
Hoellering 
(U.S.) 
appointed 
following the 
resignation of 
Hamzeh 
Haddad 
(Jordanian), 
 
(b) Ad Hoc 
Proceeding 
(2001) 
President: 
Konstantinos 
D. Kerameus 
(Greek) 
Members: 
Andreas 
Bucher (Swiss), 
Francisco 
Orrego Vicuña 
(Chilean)   
 
(c) 
Interpretation 
Proceeding 
(2004) 
President:  
Klaus M. Sachs 
(German) 
Arbitrators: 
Ibrahim 
Fadlallah 
(Lebanese/Fren
ch), Carl F. 
Salans (U.S.) 
  Mfr. 
Hanover 
Trust Co.  
v. Arab 
 President: 
Ignaz Seidl-
Hohenveldern 
(Austrian)  
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Republic of 
Egypt and 
General 
Authority 
for 
Investment 
and Free 
Zones, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/89/1 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
no award. 
Presumably 
United 
States 
Arbitrators: 
Mohamed 
Yassin Abdel 
A’Al 
(Sudanese),  
Andreas 
Bucher (Swiss)   
 Hague 
(prelim) 
Washingto
n,D.C. 
(seat) 
Southern 
Pacific 
Props. 
(Middle 
East) Ltd. v. 
Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/84/3 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Incorporate
d in Hong 
Kong,  
Peter Munk as 
Agent, assisted 
by: William 
Laurence Craig, 
Jan Paulsson, 
Paul D. 
Friedland, Jean-
Claude Najar, 
Harvey 
McGregor Q.C., 
Mohammed 
Kamel, Charles 
Kaplan and 
Michael 
Polkinghorne as 
Counsel and 
Aron Broches as 
Consultant for 
Claimant  
 
Iskandar 
Ghattas, assisted 
by Hassan 
Baghdadi, 
Fawzy Mansour, 
Jean-Denis 
Bredin, Robert 
Saint-Esteban, 
Ahmed Medhat 
and Emmanuel 
Gaillard as 
Counsel and 
Rudolf Dolzer as 
Consultant for 
Respondent 
(a) Original 
Arbitration 
Proceeding 
President: 
Eduardo 
Jimenez de 
Arechaga 
(Uruguayan) 
Arbitrators: 
Mohamed 
Amin El Mahdi 
(Egyptian), 
Robert F. 
Pietrowski, Jr. 
(U.S.)  
 
(b) Annulment 
Proceeding Ad 
hoc Committee 
President: 
Claude 
Reymond 
(Swiss) 
Members: 
Arghyrios A. 
Fatouros 
(Greek), Kéba 
Mbaye 
(Senegalese) 
Yes. Note 
two 
decisions 
on 
jurisdiction 
Nov 27, 
1985 and 
April 14, 
1988. 
Dissenting 
opinion on 
jurisdiction 
(Mohamed 
Amin El 
Mahdi)•A
ward and 
Dissenting 
Opinion of 
May 20, 
1992, 8 
ICSID 
Rev.—FILJ 
328 (1993); 
32 ILM 933 
(1993), with 
correction 
at 32 ILM 
1470 (1993); 
8 Int’l Arb. 
Rep., No. 8, 
at Sec. A 
(Aug. 1993); 
19 Y.B. 
Com. Arb. 
51 (1994) 
(excerpts); 3 
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ICSID Rep. 
189 (1995); 
French 
translation 
of English 
original in 
121 Journal 
du droit 
internationa
l 229 (1994) 
(excerpts). 
Gabon Paris Participacio
nes 
Inversiones 
Portuarias 
SARL v. 
Gabonese 
Republic, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/08/17   
 President: Jan 
Paulsson 
(French)   
Arbitrators: 
Ibrahim 
Fadlallah 
(Lebanese/Fren
ch), Brigitte 
Stern (French)   
 
 Paris Compagnie 
d’Exploitati
on du 
Chemin de 
Fer 
Transgabon
ais v. 
Gabonese 
Republic, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/04/5 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Incorporate
d in Gabon 
but tribunal 
found 
sufficient 
“foreign 
control” to 
confer 
jurisdiction 
 (a) Original 
Arbitration 
Proceeding 
President:  
Ibrahim 
Fadlallah 
(Lebanese/Fren
ch) 
Arbitrators:  
Charles 
Jarrosson 
(French), 
Michel Gentot 
(French)  
 
(b) Annulment 
Proceeding 
President:  
Franklin 
Berman 
(British) 
Members:  
Ahmed Sadek 
El-Kosheri 
(Egyptian), Rolf 
Knieper 
(German)  
Yes 
  Société 
d’Etudes de 
Travaux et 
de Gestion 
SETIMEG 
S.A. v. 
 President: 
Claude 
Reymond 
(Swiss)   
Arbitrators: 
Henri Caillavet 
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Republic of 
Gabon, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/87/1   
(French),* 
Marie-
Madeleine 
Mborantsuo  
(Gabonese) 
 
* Henri 
Caillavet 
(French) 
appointed 
following the 
resignation of 
Edgar Faure 
(French) 
The 
Gambia 
 Alimenta 
S.A. v. 
Republic of 
The 
Gambia, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/99/5   
 President: 
Charles N. 
Brower (U.S.)   
Arbitrators: 
Samuel K.B. 
Asante 
(Ghanaian),   
Kenneth S. 
Rokison 
(British)   
  
 
Ghana London Gustav F W 
Hamester 
GmbH & 
Co. KG v. 
Republic of 
Ghana, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/07/24  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Joint 
venture 
between 
Hamester, a 
German 
company, 
and a 
company 
created 
under laws 
of Ghana  
  
Akbar Ali, AFA 
Law, London 
UK, Andrew 
Goddard Q.C. & 
Riaz Hussain 
Atkin Chambers,  
London UK for 
Claimant  
 
Hon. Betty 
Mould-Iddrisu 
Attorney-
General and 
Minister for 
Justice, Republic 
of Ghana and 
Arthur Marriott 
Q.C., Thomas 
Geuther, Paul 
Cohen & 
Christina 
Loucas, Dewey 
& LeBoeuf, 
London UK for 
Respondent 
President: 
Brigitte Stern  
(French) 
Arbitrators:   
Bernardo M. 
Cremades 
(Spanish), Toby 
Landau 
(British) 
Yes re: 
claim 
No re: 
counterclai
m 
 The 
Hague 
Vacuum 
Salt Prods. 
Ltd. v. 
Republic of 
Mr. Joel B. Hams 
Mr. Gerald J. 
Ferguson 
Mr. E. Kwasi 
President:  
Robert Y. 
Jennings 
(British) 
No 
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Ghana, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/92/1   
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Incorporate
d under 
laws of 
Ghana – no 
jurisdiction 
Mensah 
Mr. Andrew G. 
McCormick for 
Claimant 
 
Mr. Joe Reindorf 
Mr. Kwabena 
A.A. Mate 
Mr. Samuel A. 
Stem for 
Respondent 
Arbitrators:  
Charles N. 
Brower (U.S.), 
Kamal Hossain 
Bangladeshi)  
Guinea  Mar. Int’l. 
Nominees 
Establishme
nt v. 
Republic of 
Guinea, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/84/4  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Liechstenst
en 
(according 
to 505 F. 
Supp. 241) 
 President: 
Donald E. 
Zubrod (U.S.) 
Arbitrators: 
Jack Berg 
(U.S.), David K. 
Sharpe (U.S.)  
 
Annulment 
Proceeding Ad 
hoc Committee 
President: 
Sompong 
Sucharitkul 
(Thai) 
Members: Aron 
Broches 
(Dutch), Kéba 
Mbaye 
(Senegalese) 
 
Resubmission 
Proceeding  
Yes 
 Paris Atl. Triton 
Co. Ltd.  v. 
People’s 
Revolutiona
ry Republic 
of Guinea, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/84/1    
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Norwegian 
Olivier Edwards, 
Marie-Christine 
de Percin for 
Claimant 
 
Jan A. Paulsson 
for Respondent 
President: 
Pieter Sanders 
(Dutch)  
Arbitrators: 
Jean-François 
Prat (French),  
Albert Jan Van 
Den Berg 
(Dutch)  
Yes 
Kenya London – 
first 
sessionTh
e Hague  
World Duty 
Free Co. 
Ltd.  v. 
Republic of 
Kenya, 
ICSID Case 
Geoffrey 
Robertson Q.C.; 
Oliva 
Holdsworth, 
Peter Buscemi 
(Morgan, Lewis 
President: 
Gilbert 
Guillaume 
(French) 
Arbitrators: 
V.V. Veeder 
Yes 
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No. 
ARB/00/7  
 
Nationality: 
Incorporate
d in Isle of 
Man 
& Brockius LLP 
Washington, 
D.C.) Paul K. 
Muite, Nairobi 
for Claimant 
 
Jan Paulsson, 
Constantine 
Partasides and 
Mitesh Kotecha 
(Freshfields, 
Bruckhaus 
Deringer) for 
Respondent  
(British),* 
Andrew Rogers 
(Australian)  
 
* V.V. Veeder 
(British) 
appointed 
following the 
resignation of 
James R. 
Crawford 
(Australian)  
Liberia  Int’l Trust 
Co. of 
Liberia v. 
Republic of 
Liberia, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/98/3   
 President: 
Albert Jan Van 
Den Berg 
(Dutch)  
Arbitrators: 
Ian S. Forrester 
(British),  
Maureen 
Ponsonby 
(British)  
 
 London 
Paris 
Liber. E. 
Timber 
Corp. v. 
Republic of 
Liberia, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/83/2 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Liberian 
but tribunal 
found that 
LETCO 
under 
“foreign 
control” of 
French 
nationals 
Robert L. 
Simpson for 
Claimant 
 
Initially Jan 
Paulsson 
(Coudert 
Brothers, Paris 
Office), Coudert 
Brothers 
withdrew. 
Liberia did not 
substitute 
representation 
and became 
“defaulting 
party” 
President: 
Bernardo M. 
Cremades 
(Spanish)  
Arbitrators: 
Jorge 
Goncalves 
Pereira 
(Portuguese),*  
D.A. Redfern 
(British)  
 
* Jorge 
Goncalves 
Pereira 
(Portuguese) 
appointed 
following the 
resignation of 
Frank Church 
(U.S.) 
  
Yes 
Madaga
scar 
 SEDITEX 
Eng’g 
Beratungsg
esellschaft 
für 
dieTextilind
ustrie 
m.b.H.  v. 
 President: 
André J.E. 
Faurès 
(Belgian) 
Conciliators: 
Dominique 
Carreau 
(French), 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
01_KIDANE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2014  3:06 AM 
644 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 35:3 
Republic of 
Madagascar
, ICSID 
Case No. 
CONC/94/
1   
Raymond 
Ranjeva 
(Malagasy) 
  SEDITEX 
Eng’g 
Beratungsg
esellschaft 
für die 
Textilindust
rie m.b.H. 
v. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Madagascar
, ICSID 
Case No. 
CONC/82/
1   
   
Mali  Société 
d’Exploitati
on des 
Mines d’Or 
de Sadiola 
S.A. v. 
Republic of 
Mali, ICSID 
Case No. 
ARB/01/5    
 President: 
Bernardo M. 
Cremades 
(Spanish)  
Arbitrators: 
Robert S.M. 
Dossou 
(Beninese),  
Ibrahim 
Fadlallah 
(Lebanese/Fren
ch) 
Yes 
Morocc
o 
Paris Consortium 
R.F.C.C. v. 
Kingdom of 
Morocco, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/00/06    
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Italian 
Piero G. Parodi, 
(Studio 
Avvocati, Milan) 
and Hamid 
Andaloussi 
(Avocat au 
Barreau de 
Casablanca) for 
Claimant 
 
Christian 
Camboulive 
(Gide Loyrette & 
Nouel, Paris), 
Ahmed Zejjari 
(Directeur des 
Affaires 
Juridiques du 
Ministère 
del’Equipement)
, Monsieur le 
(a) Original 
Arbitration 
Proceeding 
President: 
Robert Briner 
(Swiss) 
Arbitrators: 
Bernardo M. 
Cremades 
(Spanish), 
Ibrahim 
Fadlallah 
(Lebanese/Fren
ch)  
 
(b) Annulment 
Proceeding Ad 
hoc Committee 
President: 
Bernard 
Hanotiau 
Yes but 
only claims 
based on 
BIT 
violations 
and related 
breach of 
contract 
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Bâtonnier 
Mohamed Naciri 
(Avocat au 
Barreau de 
Casablanca), and 
Aurélia 
Antonietti,  
Gaëlle Le Quillec 
(Gide Loyrette & 
Nouel, Paris) for 
Respondent  
(Belgian) 
Members: 
Arghyrios A. 
Fatouros 
(Greek), 
Franklin 
Berman 
(British)  
 Paris Salini 
Costruttori 
S.p.A. & 
Italstrade 
S.P.A. v. 
Kingdom of 
Morocco, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/00/4    
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Italian 
Antonio 
Crivellaro 
(Bonnelli Erede 
& Pappalardo); 
Giorgio 
Sacerdoti for 
Claimant 
 
Ahmed Zejjari 
(Head of the 
Legal 
Department, 
Ministry of 
Infrastructure), 
Mr. le Bâtonnier 
Mohammed 
Naciri 
(Casablanca), 
Aurélia 
Antonietti, 
Christian 
Camboulive 
(Gide Loyrette & 
Nouel, Paris) for 
Respondent 
President: 
Robert Briner 
(Swiss) 
Arbitrators: 
Bernardo M. 
Cremades 
(Spanish), 
Ibrahim 
Fadlallah 
(Lebanese/Fren
ch)  
Yes but 
only claims 
based on 
BIT 
violations  
  Holiday 
Inns S.A. v. 
Kingdom of 
Morocco, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/72/1   
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Holiday 
Inns: Swiss; 
Occidental 
Petroleum: 
American 
 President: 
Gunnar 
Lagergren 
(Swedish)* 
Arbitrators: 
Paul Reuter 
(French),  
J.C. Schultsz 
(Dutch)**  
 
* Gunnar 
Lagergren 
(Swedish) 
appointed 
following the 
passing away 
of Sture Petren 
(Swedish) 
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** J.C. Schultsz 
(Dutch) 
appointed 
following the 
resignation of 
John Foster 
(British) 
Niger  TG World 
Petroleum 
Ltd. v. 
Republic of 
Niger, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
CONC/03/
1 
   
Nigeria Paris Shell 
Nigeria 
Ultra Deep 
Ltd. v. 
Federal 
Republic of 
Nigeria, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/07/18 
 President: Juan 
Fernández-
Armesto 
(Spanish)* 
Arbitrators: 
Hamid G. 
Gharavi 
(Iranian/Frenc
h), William W. 
Park (U.S.)  
 
* Juan 
Fernández-
Armesto 
(Spanish) 
appointed 
following the 
Resignation of 
Nabil Elaraby 
(Egyptian) 
 
  Guadalupe 
Gas 
Products 
Corp. v. 
Federal 
Republic of 
Nigeria, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/78/1 
 President: 
Ivan 
Wallenberg 
(Swedish)  
Arbitrators: 
Elihu 
Lauterpacht 
(British),  
Pieter Sanders 
(Dutch)  
 
Rwanda  Olyana 
Holdings 
LLC v. 
Republic of 
Rwanda, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
 President: 
Bruno Simma 
(German)  
Arbitrators: 
Pierre Lalive 
(Swiss),  
Brigitte Stern 
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ARB/10/10 (French)  
Senegal Initially 
the Hague 
(subseque
nt 
hearings 
could take 
place in 
Paris or 
any other 
place 
upon 
agreement 
of parties) 
Société 
Ouest 
Africaine 
des Bétons 
Industriels 
v. Senegal, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/82/1 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
SOABI 
incorporate 
in Senegal 
but 
Tribunal 
found 
“foreign 
control” 
Belgian 
In Jurisdiction 
Proceeding:  
Gilbert-Charles 
Danon for 
Claimant 
 
Moctar Mbacké 
(agent judiciaire 
de l’Etat); Patrick 
F. Murray and 
Christian Valntin 
for Respondent 
President: 
Aron Broches 
(Dutch)* 
Arbitrators: 
Kéba Mbaye 
(Senegalese),  
J.C. Schultsz 
(Dutch)**  
 
* Aron Broches 
(Dutch) 
appointed 
following the 
resignation of 
Rudolf 
Bindschedler 
(Swiss) 
 
** J.C. Schultsz 
(Dutch) 
appointed 
following the 
resignation of 
Jean Van 
Houtte 
(Belgian) 
  
Yes. Two 
discussions 
jurisdiction 
decision of 
Aug. 1 1984 
and in Feb 
25, 1988 
final award. 
Kéba 
Mbaye 
(Senegalese
) Dissenting 
opinion 
refers to 
1984 
decision on 
jurisdiction  
Seychell
es 
Sydney 
(Int.) 
London 
(Oral) 
CDC Grp. 
plc  v.  
Republic of 
Seychelles, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/02/14  
  
Investor 
Nationality: 
Incorporate
d in 
England 
and Wales 
 (a) Original 
Arbitration 
Proceeding Sole 
Arbitrator:  
Anthony 
Mason 
(Australian)  
 
(b) Annulment 
Proceeding                 
Ad hoc 
Committee   
President:  
Charles N. 
Brower (U.S.) 
Members:  
Michael Hwang 
(Singaporean), 
David A.R. 
Williams (New 
Zealand)  
Yes 
South 
Africa 
London – 
first 
session 
The 
Hague -- 
Piero 
Foresti, 
Laura de 
Carli and 
others v. 
Peter Leon, 
Kevin Williams, 
Vladislav 
Movshovich, 
and Jonathan 
President: 
Vaughan Lowe 
(U.K.) 
Arbitrators: 
Charles N. 
Yes 
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hearing Republic of 
South 
Africa, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB(AF)/0
7/1  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Italian 
nationals; 
Finstone: 
Inc. in 
Luxembour
g 
Veeran (Webber 
Wentzel); Toby 
T. Landau QC; 
Professor Sir 
Elihu 
Lauterpacht CBE 
QC; and Dr. 
Guglielmo 
Verdirame for 
Claimants 
 
Jan Paulsson, 
Georgios 
Petrochilos,  
Jonathan Gass, 
and Ben 
Juratowitch 
(Freshfields 
Bruckhaus 
Deringer); Gerrit 
Grobler SC, 
instructed by 
Sipho Mathebula 
(Office of the 
State Attorney of 
the Republic of 
South Africa) for 
Respondent* 
 
* Seth Nthai was 
involved in the 
proceeding but 
was withdrawn 
by South Africa 
Brower (U.S.), 
Joseph M. 
Matthews 
(U.S.)  
  Republic of 
Gabon v. 
Société 
Serete S.A., 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/76/1 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Republic of 
Gabon 
 President: 
Pierre Tercier 
(Swiss)   
Arbitrators: 
Victor-Gaston 
Martiny 
(Belgian),     
Hans 
Spitznagel 
(Swiss)   
 
Tanzani
a 
London Standard 
Chartered 
Bank v. 
United 
Republic of 
Tanzania, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
Herbert Smith 
Freehills 
(London, UK) 
for Claimant  
 
Mkono & Co. 
(Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania); 
President: 
William W. 
Park (U.S.) 
Arbitrators: 
Barton Legum 
(U.S.), Michael 
C. Pryles 
(Australian)   
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/1
01_KIDANE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2014  3:06 AM 
2014] THE CHINA-AFRICA FACTOR 649 
ARB/10/12  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Hong Kong 
Hunton  & 
Williams 
(Washington, 
D.C., U.S.) for 
Respondent 
 Paris Biwater 
Gauff 
(Tanzania) 
Ltd. v. 
United 
Republic of 
Tanzania, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/05/22 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Incorporate
d in 
England 
and Wales 
Judith Gill, 
Mathew 
Gearing, Hannah 
Ambrose, 
Michelle de 
Kluyver, 
Autumn Ellis 
and Andrew 
Pullen (Allen & 
Overy LLP, 
London, U.K.) 
for Claimant 
 
Julius Mallaba 
(Attorney-
General’s 
Chambers Dar es 
Salaam, Tanz.);  
Hon. Nimrod E. 
Mkono MP; Dr. 
Wilbert B. 
Kapinda, Carel 
Daele and Bart 
Williams 
(Mkono & Co., 
Dar es Salaam, 
Tanz.) & Jan 
Paulsson, D. 
Brian King, 
Jonathan J. Gass 
and Marijn  
Heemskerk 
(Freshfields, 
Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands) for 
Respondent 
President:  
Bernard 
Hanotiau 
(Belgian) 
Arbitrators:  
Gary B. Born 
(U.S.), Toby 
Landau (U.K.)  
Yes re: BIT 
No re: TIA 
(Tanzanian 
Investment 
Act of 1997)  
 London Tanzania 
Electric 
Supply Co. 
Ltd. v. Ind. 
Power 
Tanzania 
Ltd., ICSID 
Case No. 
ARB/98/8   
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Odd–
 (a) Original 
Arbitration 
Proceeding 
President:  
Kenneth S. 
Rokison (U.K.) 
Arbitrators:  
Charles N. 
Brower (U.S.), 
Andrew Rogers 
(Australian) 
 
(b) 
Yes 
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Claimant is 
incorporate
d in 
Tanzania –
public 
utility 
wholly 
owned by 
Tanzania 
government
.  
Respondent 
is joint 
venture 
between 
Tanzanian 
engineering 
company 
and 
Malaysian 
corp. 
Interpretation 
Proceeding  
President:  
Kenneth S. 
Rokison (U.K.) 
Arbitrators:  
Makhdoom Ali 
Khan 
(Pakistani),* 
(U.S.)Andrew 
Rogers 
(Australian) 
 
* Makhdoom 
Ali Khan 
appointed after 
resignation of 
Charles N. 
Brower  
Togo Paris Togo 
Electricité 
& GDF-
Suez 
Energie 
Services v. 
Republic of 
Togo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/06/7    
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Togo 
Electricity: 
registered 
in Togo 
(majority of 
stock 
owned by 
French co.); 
GDF: 
French 
Thierry Lauriol 
(Cabinet Jeantet 
Associés, Paris, 
France) for Togo  
 
Ibrahim 
Fadlallah & 
Christine Baude-
Tuxidor (Paris, 
France) for GDF    
 
Eric Sossah 
(New Haven, 
Connecticut) & 
Amélie Bulté 
(Paris, France) 
for Respondent  
 
Annul. 
Proceeding: 
Same as above 
for Claimants  
 
Hamid G. 
Gharavi, 
Bertrand 
Derains, Marie-
Laure Bizeau, 
Nada Sader 
(Derains & 
Gharavi, Paris, 
France); Mathieu 
Hérisson (Paris, 
(a) Original 
Arbitration 
Proceeding 
President: 
Ahmed Sadek 
El-Kosheri 
(Egyptian) 
Arbitrators: 
Marc 
Grüninger 
(Swiss), Marc 
Lalonde 
(Canadian)  
 
(b) Annulment 
Proceeding 
President: 
Albert Jan Van 
Denberg 
(Neth.) 
Members: 
Franklin 
Berman (U.K.), 
Rolf Knieper 
(German)  
Yes 
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France) for 
Respondent 
  Togo 
Electricité 
v. Republic 
of Togo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
CONC/05/
1 
 President: 
António Maria 
Ribeiro De 
Sampaio 
Caramelo 
(Portuguese)  
Conciliators: 
Bernard 
Hanotiau 
(Belgian),  
Pierre B. 
Meunier 
(Canadian) 
 
Tunisia  Ghaith R. 
Pharaon v. 
Republic of 
Tunisia, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/86/1   
 President: 
Claude 
Reymond 
(Swiss) 
Arbitrators: 
Giorgio Bernini 
(Italian), Karl-
Heinz 
Böckstiegel 
(German) 
 
Zimbab
we 
Paris Bernardus 
Henricus 
Funnekotte
r & Others  
v. Republic 
of 
Zimbabwe, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/05/6 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Several 
individual 
farmers: 
Netherland
s 
Charles Owen 
Verrill, Jr. (Wiler 
Rein U.S.,  
Washington, 
D.C.); Matthew 
Coleman 
(Steptoe & 
Johnson London, 
U.K.) for 
Claimant 
 
Fatima Maxwell 
& Virginia 
Mabiza (Civil 
Division, 
Attorney 
General’s Office 
Harare, 
Zimbabwe); 
Phillip 
Kimbrough & 
Tristan Moreau 
(Kimbrough & 
Associates, Paris, 
France) for 
Respondent 
President: 
Gilbert 
Guillame  
(French)  
Arbitrators: 
Ronald A. 
CASS (U.S.),  
Mohammad 
Wasizafar 
(Pakistani)  
Yes 
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APPENDIX II 
Country Location Parties Liability 
Host 
State 
(Yes / No) 
Award  Costs 
Awarded 
(state/claim
./split) 
Annulment 
(Yes / No) 
Algeria Paris LESI, S.p.A. 
& Astaldi, 
S.p.A. v. 
People's 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Algeria, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/05/3 
 
Investor 
nationality: 
Italian (E) 
No  Costs split 
between 
parties 
 
  Consortium 
Groupement 
L.E.S.I. - 
DIPENTA v. 
People's 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Algeria, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/03/8 
 
Investor 
nationality: 
Italian (E) 
  Costs split 
between 
parties 
 
Burkina 
Faso 
 Société 
d'Investigati
on de 
Recherche et 
d'Exploitatio
n Minière v. 
Burkina 
Faso, ICSID 
Case No. 
ARB/97/1 
 
Investor 
nationality: 
French 
(incorporate
d under 
French law) 
    
Burundi Paris Antoine 
Goetz v. 
No: re 
legitimate 
Parties 
reache
Split   
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Republic of 
Burundi, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/95/3 
 
Investor 
nationality: 
Belgian 
changes 
in 
governme
nt policy 
concernin
g 
economy; 
discrimin
ation; 
encouragi
ng 
investme
nt 
 
Possibly: 
violation 
of 
adopting 
measures 
to restrict 
investors 
of 
property 
rights. 
Must 
provide 
compensa
tion or 
grant new 
free zone 
certificate 
 
 
  
d a 
settlem
ent 
which 
became 
the 
Award 
Burun
di pay 
USD $ 
2,989,6
36 plus 
8% 
interest 
Also 
drafted 
Special 
Conve
ntion 
for 
future 
econo
mic 
interact
ions 
betwee
n 
parties. 
  Antoine 
Goetz v. 
Republic of 
Burundi, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/01/2 
 
Investor 
nationality: 
Belgian 
Yes USD 
$1,000,
000 
damag
es for 
illegal 
measur
es 
takes 
with 
regard 
to 
African 
Bank of 
Comm
erce. 
€175,00
0 euros 
damag
es for 
Split   
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unlawf
ul 
measur
e 
regardi
ng 
Affirm
et, 
CCA & 
CCA 
Mainte
nance 
plus 
interest 
Camero
on 
 Lafarge v. 
Republic of 
Cameroon, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/02/4   
    
 Washingt
on, D.C. 
Klöckner 
Industrie-
Anlagen 
GmbH v. 
United 
Republic of 
Cameroon & 
Société 
Camerounai
se des 
Engrais, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/81/2 
 
Investor 
nationality: 
German 
No Claim 
and 
counter
claim 
rejecte
d 
Split – Each 
party to 
pay own 
costs and 
half costs of 
arbitration 
Yes – 
Annulled. 
Unanimous 
decision to 
annul 
award. 
Costs of 
annulment 
split 
equally 
Central 
African 
Republi
c 
Paris Shareholder
s of SESAM 
v. Central 
African 
Republic, 
CONC/07/
1 
    
 Paris M. 
Meerapfel 
Söhne AG v. 
Central 
African 
Republic, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/07/10 
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Democr
atic 
Republi
c of the 
Congo 
Zurich Int’l 
Quantum 
Res. Ltd., 
Frontier 
SPRL & 
Compagnie 
Minière de 
Sakania 
SPRL v. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/10/21 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
IQR 
registered in 
British 
Virgin 
Islands; 
Frontier: 
Congolese; 
COMISA: 
Congolese 
    
 Paris African 
Holding Co. 
of Am., Inc. 
& Société 
Africaine de 
Constructio
n au Congo 
S.A.R.L. v. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/05/21 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
African 
Holding: 
United 
States; 
SAFRICAS: 
Congolese 
No  Split – each 
party to 
pay own 
costs and 
half costs of 
arbitration 
 
  Russell Res. 
Int’l Ltd. v. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
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the Congo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/04/11 
 Paris Miminco 
LLC v. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/03/14  
 Award 
embod
ying 
parties' 
settlem
ent 
agreem
ent 
was 
render
ed 
11/19/
2007) 
  
  Ridgepointe 
Overseas 
Dev., Ltd. v. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/00/8  
    
  Patrick 
Mitchell v. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/99/7  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
American 
Yes USD 
$750,00
0 plus 
7.75% 
interest  
DRC to pay 
USD 
$95,000 
costs, Any 
of 
claimant's 
costs 
beyond 
$95,000 
paid by 
Claimant 
Yes – 
Annulled. 
Manifest 
excess of 
powers and 
failure to 
state 
reasons 
  Banro Am. 
Res., Inc. et 
al. v. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/98/7  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
A bit 
muddy. 
Banro 
American 
 Only 
excerpt
s 
publish
ed 
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Resources: 
American; 
Banro 
Resource: 
Canadian; 
SAKIMA: 
Congolese 
subsidiary 
 Washingt
on, D.C. 
Suppleme
ntal 
hearing 
in Paris 
Am. Mfg. & 
Trading, Inc. 
v. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/93/1  
 
Investor 
nationality: 
American 
Yes USD 
$9,000,
000 
plus 
7.5% 
interest 
Split  
Republi
c of the 
Congo 
GenevaPa
ris 
S.A.R.L. 
Benvenuti & 
Bonfant v. 
People's 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/77/2   
 
Investor 
nationality: 
Head office 
in Rome; 
Italian 
Yes • CFA 
3,300,0
00 lost 
profits 
• CFA 
110,098
,936 
10% 
interest 
compe
nsation 
value 
of 
PLASC
O• 
CFA14
2,780,2
53 
advanc
es to  
PLASC
O  • 
10% 
Interest 
for 
advanc
es in 
1973 & 
1974 
(CFA 
64,002,
539) & 
1975 
Split – Each 
party to 
pay own 
costs and 
half costs of 
arbitration 
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(CFA 
78,777,
714),  • 
CFA 
61,000,
000 to 
SODIS
CA for 
debts 
of 
PLASC
O • 
CFA 
1,000, 
000 
Plus 
interest 
indem
nificati
on as 
conseq
uence 
of  
dissolu
tion of 
EDICO 
• CFA 
5,000,0
00 
Moral 
damag
es plus 
interest 
• US 
$15,000 
plus  
6% int. 
on 
add'l 
damag
es  
 Paris AGIP S.p.A. 
v. People's 
Republic of 
the Congo, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/77/1 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
AGIP S.p.A 
Italian; 
subsidiary 
Yes •Lit. 
202,807
, 838 
(Annex
es 50 & 
52), US 
$ 
333,297
.76 
(Annex 
56),  
F968, 
071.86  
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AGIP 
(Congolese) 
SA 
(Congolese); 
AGIP 
owned 90% 
of 
Hydrocarbo
ns (Swiss) 
(Annex
es 54 & 
58) for 
non-
recover
y of 
comme
rcial 
debts • 
F16,688
,388 
(Annex
es 
61,63, 
65 and 
67 for 
payme
nts 
made 
by 
AGIP 
as 
guaran
tor • F 
2,800,0
00 for 
50% of 
shares 
of 
compa
ny • F3 
lost 
profits 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
 Compagnie 
Française 
pour le 
Développem
ent des 
Fibres 
Textiles v. 
Côte 
d'Ivoire, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/97/8  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
no award. 
CFDT 
appears to 
be French. 
    
  Adriano 
Gardella 
No. Claim 
and 
 Each party 
to bear own 
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S.p.A. v. 
Côte 
d'Ivoire, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/74/1   
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Italian 
Counter-
claim 
rejected 
costs split 
cost of 
tribunal 
Egypt Paris Malicorp 
Ltd. v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/08/18 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Incorporate
d in the U.K. 
No Tribun
al 
rejecte
d claim 
Costs split 
between 
parties 
 
 Paris Helnan Int’l 
Hotels A/S 
v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/05/19  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Incorporate
d in 
Denmark 
No  Split – Each 
party to 
pay own 
costs and 
half costs of 
arbitration 
Yes.  Annul 
holding in 
paragraphs 
148 and 162 
of Award.  
Tribunal 
exceeded 
authority 
by 
requiring 
Helnan to 
exhaust 
local 
remedies 
before 
commencin
g ICSID 
proceeding.  
Annulment 
did not 
affect 
substance 
of Award in 
favor of 
Egypt 
 Paris Waguih Elie 
George Siag 
& Clorinda 
Vecchi v. 
Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt, 
Yes $74,550
,794.75 
plus 
interest
. 
Respondent 
must pay 
$6,000,000 
of 
Claimant's 
legal costs.  
Cost of 
Annulment 
proceeding 
begun, 
discontinue
d July 26, 
2010 
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ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/05/15   
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Italian 
(investor 
dual 
Egyptian 
citizenship 
point of 
controversy 
in 
Jurisdiction 
decision) 
tribunal is 
split 
 Paris Jan de Nul 
N.V. & 
Dredging 
Int’l N.V. v. 
Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/04/13  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Belgian 
No.  
Claims 
dismissed 
on merits 
 Split – Each 
party to 
pay own 
costs and 
half costs of 
arbitration 
 
 The 
Hague 
Joy Mining 
Machinery 
Ltd. v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/03/11  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Incorporate
d under the 
laws of 
England and 
Wales 
No  Split – Each 
party to 
pay own 
costs and 
half costs of 
arbitration 
 
 Paris - 1st 
sess. 
Cairo - 
hearing 
of 
witnesses 
Geneva - 
hearing 
Ahmonseto, 
Inc. & 
Others v. 
Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
No  Split – Each 
party to 
pay own 
costs and 
half costs of 
arbitration 
Annulment 
proceeding 
initiated but 
subsequentl
y 
discontinue
d for lack of 
payment 
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of 
witnesses 
Geneva - 
oral 
argument 
ARB/02/15 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
United 
States 
 Paris Champion 
Trading Co. 
& 
Ameritrade 
Int’l, Inc. v. 
Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/02/9  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Champion: 
United 
States; 
Ameritrade 
Internationa
l: United 
States; James 
T. Wahba, 
John B. 
Wahba and 
Timothy T. 
Wahba (dual 
citizens 
United 
States and 
Egypt) 
No  Costs 
award to 
Egypt; 
Claimant 
pays all 
own cost, 
all costs of 
arbitration 
and half of 
Egypt costs 
 
 Initially 
Washingt
on D.C. 
(subseque
nt 
hearings 
could 
take place 
in Paris, 
Hague or 
Washingt
on D.C. 
or any 
other 
place 
upon 
agreemen
t of 
Middle East 
Cement 
Shipping & 
Handling 
Co. S.A. v. 
Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/99/6 
Yes, but 
some 
claims for 
damages 
rejected. 
$ 
2,190,4
30.00 
and 
$1,558,
970.00 
in 
compo
und 
interest
. 
Split – Each 
party to 
pay own 
costs and 
half costs of 
arbitration 
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parties) 
 The 
Hague – 
1st 
session,  
Paris 
Wena Hotels 
Ltd. v. Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/98/4  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Incorporate
d in United 
Kingdom 
Yes Appro
x. 
$20,000
,000 
plus 
costs 
and 9% 
interest 
Yes, but 
only 
portion of 
attorney's 
fees and 
costs 
incurred in 
presenting 
merits of 
arbitration 
Application 
for 
annulment 
rejected 
  Manufacture
rs Hanover 
Trust Co.  v. 
Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt & 
General 
Authority 
for 
Investment 
and Free 
Zones, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/89/1 
  
    
 Hague 
(prelim)
Washingt
on,D.C. 
(seat) 
Southern 
Pacific 
Props. 
(Middle 
East) Ltd. v. 
Arab 
Republic of 
Egypt, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/84/3 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Incorporate
d in Hong 
Kong 
Yes US $ 
27.6 
million 
Egypt had 
to pay 
$5,093,00 
for legal, 
audit and 
arbitration 
costs 
attributable 
to 
proceeding
s 
Annulment 
proceeding 
initiated but 
subsequentl
y 
discontinue
d because 
of 
settlement 
by parties 
Gabon Paris Participacio
nes 
Inversiones 
Portuarias 
SARL v. 
Gabonese 
Republic, 
ICSID Case 
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No. 
ARB/08/17   
 Paris Compagnie 
d'Exploitatio
n du 
Chemin de 
Fer 
Transgabon
ais v. 
Gabonese 
Republic, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/04/5  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Incorporate
d in Gabon 
but tribunal 
found 
sufficient 
"foreign 
control" to 
confer 
jurisdiction 
Yes 71,130,
377,782
.00 
Central 
African 
Francs 
–
damag
es 
(from 
compla
int in 
US 
Dist. Ct  
S.D. 
N.Y.   
1:2010c
v04061
) 
$ 296,455 
U.S. dollars 
and 
€1,100,000 
euros 
expenses 
and costs 
(from 
complaint 
in US Dist. 
Ct  S.D. 
N.Y.   
1:2010cv040
61) 
Annulment 
filed, ICSID 
rejected; 
Affirmed 
award, 
lifted stay 
of execution 
of award; 
Assessed 
Gabon costs 
of 
annulment 
challenge 
  Société 
d'Etudes de 
Travaux et 
de Gestion 
SETIMEG 
S.A v. 
Republic of 
Gabon , 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/87/1 
    
The 
Gambia 
 Alimenta 
S.A. v. 
Republic of 
The Gambia, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/99/5  
    
Ghana London  Gustav 
F.W. 
Hamester 
GmbH & 
Co. KG v. 
Republic of 
Ghana, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/07/24 
No  Split – Each 
party to 
pay own 
costs and 
half costs of 
arbitration 
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Investor 
Nationality: 
Joint 
venture: 
Hamester 
German and 
company 
created 
under laws 
of Ghana 
 The 
Hague 
Vacuum Salt 
Prod. Ltd. V. 
Republic of 
Ghana, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/92/1   
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Incorporate
d under 
laws of 
Ghana -- no 
jurisdiction 
No  Split – Each 
party to 
pay own 
costs and 
half costs of 
arbitration 
 
Guinea  Mar. Int’l 
Nominees 
Establishme
nt v. 
Republic of 
Guinea, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/84/4  
Investor 
Nationality: 
Liechtenstei
n (according 
to 505 F. 
Supp. 241) 
Yes, but 
Guinea 
also 
received 
an award 
on 
counter-
claim  
MINE: 
$12,459
,483 
(incl. 
$275,00
0 for 
ICSID 
arbitrat
ion) 
Guinea
:$210,0
00 
Balanc
e due 
to 
MINE:
$12,249
,483 
Split – Each 
party to 
pay own 
legal costs. 
MINE 
award 
included 
arbitration 
costs 
Partial.  Ad 
hoc rejected 
annulment 
holding 
resp. in 
breach of 
contact. 
Granted 
annulment 
on damages  
 Paris Atl. Triton 
Co. Ltd.  v. 
People's 
Revolutiona
ry Republic 
of Guinea, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/84/1    
Investor 
Split Atlanti
c 
Triton 
awarde
d 
US$226
,867 
but 
had to 
issue 
Split – Each 
party to 
pay own 
costs and 
half costs of 
arbitration 
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Nationality: 
Norwegian 
bank 
guaran
tee to 
Guinea 
in 
same 
amoun
t 
pendin
g final 
judgme
nt in 
shipyar
d 
procee
dings 
 
A.T. 
awarde
d 
$100,00 
outstan
ding 
manag
ement 
fees 
Kenya London - 
first 
session 
The 
Hague  
World Duty 
Free Co. Ltd.  
v. Republic 
of Kenya, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/00/07
7  
 
Investor 
Nationality:   
Incorporate
d in Isle of 
Man 
No Claim 
rejecte
d 
Split – Each 
party to 
pay own 
costs and 
half costs of 
arbitration 
 
Liberia  Int’l Trust 
Co. of 
Liberia v. 
Republic of 
Liberia, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/98/3   
    
 London 
Paris 
Liberian E. 
Timber 
Corp. v. 
Government 
of the 
Republic of 
Yes US 
$8,095, 
904 lost 
profits; 
US 
$654,38
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Liberia, 
ICSID Case 
No.  
ARB/83/2 
   
Investor 
Nationality: 
Liberian but 
tribunal 
found that 
LETCO 
under 
"foreign 
control" of 
French 
nationals 
2 cost 
incurre
d as 
result 
of 
exprop
riation 
Madaga
scar 
 Seditex 
Eng’g 
Beratungsge
sellschaft für 
dieTextilind
ustrie 
GmbH.  v. 
Madagascar, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
CONC/94/
1   
    
  Seditex 
Eng’g 
Beratungsge
sellschaft für 
die 
Textilindust
rie m.b.H. v. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Madagascar, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
CONC/82/
1   
    
Mali  Société 
d'Exploitatio
n des Mines 
d'Or de 
Sadiola S.A. 
v. Republic 
of Mali, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/01/5    
Yes Mali 
ordere
d to 
refund 
collecte
d 
stamp 
duty 
(CFA 
1,800,0
24,000) 
Mali had to 
pay all 
costs and 
expenses of 
tribunal  
 
Morocc Paris Consortium No  Split – Each Claimant's 
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o R.F.C.C. v. 
Kingdom of 
Morocco, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/00/6    
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Italian 
party to 
pay own 
costs and 
half costs of 
arbitration 
annulment 
arguments 
rejected 
 Paris Salini 
Costruttori 
S.p.A. & 
Italstrade 
S.p.A. v. 
Kingdom of 
Morocco, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/00/4 
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Italian 
    
  Holiday 
Inns S.A. & 
Others  v. 
Kingdom of 
Morocco, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/72/1 
   
Investor 
Nationality: 
Holiday 
Inns: Swiss; 
Occidental 
Petroleum: 
American 
    
Niger  TG World 
Petroleum 
Ltd. v. 
Republic of 
Niger, 
ICSID Case 
No.  
CONC/03/
1 
    
Nigeria Paris Shell 
Nigeria 
Ultra Deep 
Ltd. v. 
Federal 
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Republic of 
Nigeria, 
ICSID Case 
No.  
ARB/07/18  
  Guadalupe 
Gas 
Products 
Corp. v. Fed. 
Republic of 
Nigeria, 
ICSID Case 
No.  
ARB/78/1  
    
Rwanda  Olyana 
Holdings 
LLC v. 
Republic of 
Rwanda, 
ICSID Case 
No.  
ARB/10/10  
    
Senegal Initially 
the 
Hague 
(subseque
nt 
hearings 
could 
take place 
in Paris 
or any 
other 
place 
upon 
agreemen
t of 
parties) 
Société 
Ouest 
Africaine 
des Bétons 
Industriels 
v. State of 
Senegal, 
ICSID Case 
No.  
ARB/82/1  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
SOABI 
incorporated 
in Senegal 
but Tribunal 
found 
"foreign 
control" 
Belgian 
Yes 150,000
,000 
FCFA -
- lost 
profits 
552,989
,664 
FCFA - 
damag
es 
255,937
,342 
FCRA -
- 
Interest 
accrue
d 
Costs split – 
Award 
breaks 
down 
tribunal 
costs 
 
Seychell
es 
Sydney 
(Int.), 
London 
(oral) 
CDC Grp. 
plc v.  
Republic of 
Seychelles , 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/02/14  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Incorporate
Yes £1,771,
096.95 
plus 9 
% 
interest
. 
State to pay 
legal fees 
and 
arbitration 
costs 
Application 
for 
annulment 
rejected 
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d in England 
and Wales 
South 
Africa 
London - 
first 
session 
The 
Hague   
hearing 
Piero 
Foresti, Ida 
Laura de 
Carli & 
Others v. 
Republic of 
South 
Africa, 
ICSID Case 
No.  
ARB(AF)/07
/1  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Italian 
nationals; 
Finstone: 
Incorporate
d in 
Luxembour
g 
No 
Claimant 
requested 
discontin
uance 
based on 
agreemen
t between 
parties. 
Award 
memoriali
zed 
dismissal 
with 
prejudice 
and 
allocation 
of costs 
Fees 
and 
costs 
only 
amoun
t 
awarde
d 
€ 4000,000 
euros for 
Respondent 
 
Concurring 
opinion 
clarifies 
that the 
moderate 
amount of 
costs 
reflects 
Claimant's 
efforts to 
employ 
Historically 
Disadvanta
ged South 
Africans 
(HDSA) 
 
  Gabon v. 
Société 
Serete S.A., 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/76/1  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Republic of 
Gabon 
    
Tanzani
a 
London Standard 
Chartered 
Bank v. 
United 
Republic of 
Tanzania, 
ICSID Case 
No.  
ARB/10/12  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Hong Kong 
    
 Paris Biwater 
Gauff 
(Tanzania) 
Ltd. v. 
United 
Republic of 
No. But 
found 
that TZ 
violated 
BIT 
No 
damag
es. 
Declara
tory 
remedi
Split – Each 
party to 
pay own 
costs and 
half costs of 
arbitration 
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Tanzania, 
ICSID Case 
No.  
ARB/05/22  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Incorporate
d in England 
and Wales 
es 
 London Tanzania 
Elec. Supply 
Co. Ltd. v. 
Independent 
Power 
Tanzania 
Ltd. , ICSID 
Case No.  
ARB/98/8  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Odd-- 
Claimant is 
incorporated 
in Tanzania 
--public 
utility 
wholly 
owned by 
Tanzania .  
Respondent 
is joint 
venture 
between 
Tanzanian 
engineering 
company 
and 
Malaysian 
corp. 
  Split – Each 
party to 
pay own 
costs and 
half costs of 
arbitration 
 
Togo Paris Togo 
Electricité & 
GDF-Suez 
Energie 
Servs. v. 
Republic of 
Togo, ICSID 
Case No.  
ARB/06/7  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Togo 
Yes, some 
of Togo 
Eleclectri-
city's 
claims 
accepted 
but other 
rejected. 
GDF's 
claims 
rejected 
and 
Responde
•10,623
,742,58
2 CFA 
francs 
contrac
tual 
indem
nities 
•1,191,
141,211 
CFA 
francs 
balance 
Each party 
to bear own 
costs split 
cost of 
tribunal as 
follows 80% 
by 
Respondent 
and 20% by 
Claimants  
Togo had to 
pay costs: € 
341.285,02 
euros à 
Togo 
Electricité et 
€200.000 
euros à 
GDF 
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Electricity: 
registered in 
Togo 
(majority of 
stock owned 
by French 
co.); GDF: 
French 
nt's 
counter-
claims 
rejected 
bank 
accts•1
,501,86
2,962 
CFA 
francs 
owners
hip in 
Togo 
electric
•58,524
,403 
CFA 
francs 
bank 
charges
•3,588,
415,997 
CFA 
francs 
balance 
on 22 
Feb 
2006•2
2.197.5
21.394 
CFR 
francs 
balance 
prior to 
22 Feb 
2006•p
lus 
interest
. 
  Togo 
Electricité v. 
Republic of 
Togo, ICSID 
Case No.  
CONC/05/
1  
    
Tunisia  Ghaith R. 
Pharaon v. 
Republic of 
Tunisia, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/86/1   
    
Zimbab
we 
Paris Bernardus 
Henricus 
Funnekotter 
& Others  v. 
Republic of 
Yes 13 
individ
ual 
claims 
to 
Parties pay 
own costs 
and 
Respondent 
pays fees of 
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Zimbabwe, 
ICSID Case 
No. 
ARB/05/6  
 
Investor 
Nationality: 
Several 
individual 
farmers: 
Netherlands 
farms 
totalin
g € 
8,220,0
00 plus 
interest 
Tribunal / 
ICSID. 
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